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I extract a global factor from cross-country output growth and find that its fluctuations are typ-
ically small, with unconditional volatility estimated at 0.06%, but highly persistent, with estimated
persistence at 0.99. The data indicate that the volatility of the global factor varies over time and that
these movements in global macroeconomic risk are an important driver of international business
cycles. My empirical results suggest that the exposure to the global factor is not homogeneous
across countries and such heterogeneity enables countries to share global volatility risk. I propose
a theoretical framework in which agents fear model misspecification can successfully replicate the
volatility-driven dynamics observed in the data.
The most recent recessions in Brazil pose a challenge for current business cycle models owing
to a key piece of legislation that causes labor to adjust in unconventional ways. We propose a
two sector model that resembles the formal and informal sectors in Brazil with the former subject
to a termination penalty inspired by said legislation. The informal sector, however, makes labor
decisions in a frictionless environment. Our model accurately predicts that recessions preceded
by long expansions impact labor levels more severely than downturns following shorter economic
booms. Also, the state dependence property of our adjustment cost allows us to replicate the delay
between the beginning of an economic downturn and the trough in the formal-sector labor level, a
feature observed in the 2014-2016 depression in Brazil.
We investigate the impact of firing costs associated with the Brazilian Warranty Fund for Time
of Service labor protection law on firms’ employment decisions and workers’ life-cycle outcomes.
We propose an overlapping generations model with search frictions in which firms are subject to
severance costs proportional to workers’ earnings history. Our main finding is that the severance
policy encourages labor-hoarding practices that allow low-productivity long-tenured workers to
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collect severance-penalty rents, as they would fail to secure employment if they were currently
unemployed. This labor-hoarding effect is especially acute for individuals closer to retirement
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CHAPTER 1
GLOBAL LONG-RUN RISK AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS CYCLES: A
FACTOR-STOCHASTIC VOLATILITY APPROACH
1.1 Introduction
It is now a consensus that the volatility of macroeconomic variables varies over time. Several
papers have documented this fact empirically and attempted to explain the underlying mechanisms
that drive these fluctuations in volatility. We find that time variation in the volatility of economic
output is also a global phenomenon with significant implications to consumption, foreign trade,
interest and exchange rates. A sizable leverage effect in the global factor of output growth indi-
cates that global volatility is strongly countercyclical. We propose a theoretical framework that
rationalizes the empirical responses of macro quantities and prices.
A large body of literature has devoted attention to the shifts in U.S. macroeconomic volatility
in the past decades. Several papers documented the decrease in macro volatility in the 1980’s and
1990’s - a period commonly referred to as the Great Moderation in the literature - and highlighted
the importance of accounting for the shift in volatility in policy-making. The causes of the Great
Moderation, however, are less agreed upon, and while some authors claim that improved monetary
policy was the main driver (Stock and Watson 2003; Cogley and Sargent 2005) others point out
that monetary policy alone is not enough to account for such a large change in the dynamics of the
economy (Sims and Zha 2006; Primiceri 2005) and suggest that others factors, such as investment-
specific shocks (Justiniano and Primiceri 2008) and financial frictions (Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist 1999), also played an important role.
While we abstract from the debate on the causes of the Great Moderation, we find that the
decrease in the volatility of economic output in the 1980’s and 1990’s is observed at a global
level but it appears to have ended in the early 2000’s, which is in line with the findings of Berger,
Grabert, and Kempa (2017) and ?, for instance. Our approach consists of extracting a common
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factor, which we refer to as the global factor, from cross-country output growth since 1960. We
find that its fluctuations are typically small, with the annualized unconditional volatility estimated
at 0.06%, but highly persistent, with estimated persistence at 0.98. In this sense, our results suggest
that the dynamics of the global factor resemble those of long-run-risk processes proposed by Bansal
and Yaron (2004).
However, time variation in the volatility of the global factor reveals that there are times in
which volatility could be several times larger than its unconditional level. The most extreme of
these episodes is the 2008 Financial crisis, when volatility of global output was about ten times
as large as its unconditional level (see Figure A.1). Our global factor also identifies1 the 1973 oil
price crisis, the 1980-1982 recession in Europe, the 2001 recession in the U.S..
The data also support the existence of an emerging-economy factor with dynamics vastly dif-
ferent from those of the global factor. Fluctuations in the BRICS factor, in reference to Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa, are very large, with unconditional volatility estimated at
1.07%, though the effect of its innovations barely lingers for a quarter, since the persistence is
estimated at −0.45. The dynamics of the BRICS factor are in line with the findings of Aguiar and
Gopinath (2007).
We focus on the global factor of output growth and find that the exposure to the global fac-
tor is not homogeneous across countries and that this heterogeneity has important business cycle
implications. More specifically, our results indicate that countries that are highly-exposed to the
global factor experience a currency appreciation when global volatility rises whereas currencies
of low-exposure countries depreciate, which confirms the results of the global macro risks liter-
ature (see, for instance, Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2011), Corte, Riddiough, and Sarno
(2016), Berg and Mark (2018), and Colacito, Croce, Gavazzony, and Ready (2018)). We also
find that fluctuations in the volatility of the global factor can explain cross-country interest rate
comovements.
1CEPR recession dates: 1974Q3-1975Q1, 1980Q1-1982Q3, 2008Q1-2009Q2. NBER recession dates: 1973M12-
1975M3, 1980M1-1980M7, 2001M3-2001M11, and 2007M12-2009M6.
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Our results also show that fluctuations in global volatility have significant impact in the dynam-
ics of macroeconomic quantities. We find that countries that are highly exposed to the global factor
- and, therefore, face a larger welfare cost from global risk movements - increase their consumption
relative to output whereas low-exposure countries increase their savings rate when global volatility
rises. We interpret these findings in light of global volatility-risk sharing: global volatility is a
common source of risk to which countries are heterogeneously exposed and countries that have a
higher welfare cost when volatility rises counteract the decline in utility via higher consumption.
This conjecture is corroborated by the response of trade balance in high- and low-exposure coun-
tries. The former experience an inflow of foreign goods whereas the latter undergo an outflow of
domestic goods. Since a current account deficit must be matched by a capital account surplus of
equal magnitude, the inflow of foreign goods in high-exposure countries commands an asset out-
flow, which entitles their trade partners to a larger share of consumption goods from high-exposure
countries in the future. In other words, the cost of the temporary increase in consumption is lower
consumption in the future, consequence of the increased indebtedness relative to the low-exposure
group.
We then propose a theoretical framework that rationalizes the dynamics of macro quantities
and prices observed in the data. Since standard time-separable preferences cannot account for
volatility-driven business cycle fluctuations, our model economy is populated by agents that view
the estimated output dynamics as an approximation to the true data generating process and, as such,
want decision rules that are robust to model misspecification (Hansen and Sargent 2008). In this
regard, this paper is part of large literature on non-standard preferences that allow for the certainty
equivalent of future utility to differ from the expected utility level. Since the seminal work of Kreps
and Porteus (1978), Epstein and Zin (1989) and Weil (1990), a number of papers have used non-
expected utility to account for empirical regularities in Macroeconomics and Finance. We discuss
how non-expected utility can successfully account for the observed responses to volatility shocks
in Section 1.3. See Bansal and Yaron (2004), Bansal, Gallant, and Tauchen (2007), Bansal, Kiku,
and Yaron (2012), Bidder and Smith (2012), Backus, Ferriere, and Zin (2015), Hansen and Sargent
(2017), Colacito, Croce, Ho, and Howard (2018) and Colacito, Croce, Liu, and Shaliastovich
3
(2018) for some contributions to this literature.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes our empirical approach. Section
1.3 discusses the challenges that our results pose to standard models with expected utility and
motivates our choice of robust preferences. Section 1.4 describes the model economy and the
mechanisms through which it replicates the dynamics observed in the data.
1.2 Empirical evidence
Our empirical approach consists of two steps. First, we estimate latent factors from cross-
country output growth data in the spirit of Kim, Shephard, and Chib (1998). We find strong evi-
dence that the volatility of these factors vary over time and that the exposure to the global factor is
not homogeneous across countries. Second, we find that the shape of the response depends on the
level of exposure to the global factor. VAR evidence of this feature complete the second step of
our empirical analysis. Our exposition begins with a description of the data.
1.2.1 Data
Our data sample consists of macroeconomic data for Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Canada, Chile, China, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, U.K, and
United States. The data series are measured quarterly and span the 1960Q1-2017Q4 period for
most countries (some emerging countries have shorter time series). Variables such as private and
government consumption, investment, exports and imports are obtained from OECD’s quarterly
national accounts website. All variables are measured in U.S. dollars of 2011 (constant PPP).
Economic data for China were obtained from Chang, Chen, Waggoner, and Zha (2015).
We define output as private consumption plus trade balance (exports minus imports) since our
theoretical framework is based on an endowment economy (see Section 1.4 for more details on
the theoretical model). Our empirical results hold2 with the addition of government consumption
and investment but accounting for investment decisions in our model economy would increase
complexity considerably without adding significant insight to the understanding of trade balance
2Preliminary robustness checks coming soon.
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and interest rate dynamics, which are the focus of this paper.
Interest rate data for industrialized economies are also obtained from OECD’s website. We
follow Neumeyer and Perri (2005) and construct interest rate series for emerging countries by
combining country-risk premium and a proxy for the world interest rate. In practice, we add
J.P. Morgan’s EMBI spreads to the U.S. short-term interest rate (3-month Treasury bill). We do
so to abstract from the additional risk premia, currency and inflation risks, for instance, that are
typically embodied in interest rates quoted in local currency and are beyond the scope of our model.
Country-risk premia data are available starting in 1987.
1.2.2 Factor-Stochastic Volatility: Specification and Identification
We model comovements in output per capita via latent factors. Given the composition of
countries in our sample, we estimate three factors: Global, Europe and BRICS. We choose the
number of factors ex-ante for both technical and economic reasons. From a technical perspec-
tive, while data-driven methods to determine the number of factors have been proposed in the
literature (see Frühwirth-Schnatter and Lopes (2010) and Kastner, Frühwirth-Schnatter, and Lopes
(2017)), they involve high-frequency data and large samples, i.e., data availability that our series
of a few decades of quarterly data simply cannot match. Restricting assumptions are also required
to identify the covariance matrix of volatility shocks, the most common being a triangular matrix
of loadings with diagonal elements assumed positive (see Geweke and Zhou (1996), Aguilar and
West (2000), Lopes and West (2004), Lopes and Carvalho (2007), to name a few). Our choice of
economically meaningful factors ex-ante imposes identification conditions in a natural way: since
European countries trade intensely with each other and have somewhat interconnected institutional
frameworks, it is reasonable to expect a large degree of comovement in their output levels. In a
similar fashion, Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa rely quite heavily on China’s demand for
raw materials, so a downturn in the Chinese economy would likely affect those countries’ output.
A similar approach was followed by Kose, Otrok, and Whiteman (2003).
In this sense, we assume that only European countries are potentially exposed to the Europe
factor and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are the only countries potentially exposed
to the BRICS factor. In other words, the European countries’ loadings on the BRICS factor are set
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to zero, and so are the BRICS’s loadings on the Europe factor. The factor to which all countries are
potentially exposed is referred to as the global factor, and no country loading on the global factor
is set to zero.
Choosing the factors to which a country’s loading is zero is analogous to the widely used
assumption of triangular matrix of loadings, with the benefit that no rotation in the loading matrix
is necessary to make the factors sensible as the order in which the countries enter the data vector
does not influence the interpretation of the factors (see Lopes and West (2004) for a discussion on
the rotation of loading matrices).
To pin down unique exposure levels, we must also impose scale identifying constraints. The
need for such constraints will become evident once we discuss the specification of our factor-
stochastic volatility model (FSV). To that end, let us denote the log of real output per capita in
country i at time t by yit. Also, let η
j
t denote the j-th latent factor and scripts w, eu and br
denote World, Europe and BRICS, respectively. Log-variance processes are denoted by {ht}, t =
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In practice, we assume output growth follows a random walk process with country-specific
drift µiy and stochastic volatility e
hit/2. Latent processes ηt are assumedAR(1) with factor-specific
persistence and stochastic volatility eh
f
jt/2, though the persistence of factors’ stochastic volatility
φηh is assumed common across factors. For parsimony, we also assume the persistence φh and
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volatility σ of idiosyncratic log-variance of output are constant across countries.
We consider leverage effects in both idiosyncratic and factor stochastic volatilities via the lever-
age parameters ρ and [ρw, ρeu, ρbr]. The leverage effect, extensively discussed in the Finance lit-
erature, consists on the observed strong correlation between negative stock returns and increases
in conditional volatility (see Black (1976), Nelson (1991), and Brandt and Kang (2004)). Black
(1976) argues that, given the amount of outstanding debt held by a company, a decline in its equity
price implies an increase in the debt-to-equity ratio, leverage, which, in turn, raises the volatility
of the company’s share price. While the leverage interpretation may not be applicable in the con-
text of aggregate output, macroeconomic variables are typically more volatile in recessions than
in expansions. Our approach is similar to that of Nakamura, Sergeyev, and Steinsson (2017), who
considered leverage effects in the dynamics of consumption.
From Eq. 1.1, unconditional log-volatilities µjh cannot be identified if we let all exposure
parameters vary freely (Pitt and Shephard 1999). To remedy this issue, we assume that the United
States exposure to the global factor is equal to one, so are Germany’s and China’s loadings on the
Europe and BRICS factors, respectively.
1.2.3 Estimation and results
The empirical treatment of stochastic volatility models has received considerable attention in
recent years and, consequently, several estimation procedures for models such as the one described
by Eq. 1.1 are available (see Ghysels, Harvey, and Renault (1996) and Shephard (2005) for com-
prehensive surveys of the literature). We estimate Eq. 1.1 via Bayesian methods closely related
to Jacquier, Polson, and Rossi (2004) and Omori, Chib, Shephard, and Nakajima (2007). Our
choice is driven by the availability of computationally efficient MCMC methods and the ability
with which Bayesian methods deal with missing data - a constant nuisance when using emerging
economies’ data.
In a general sense, our prior distributions, shown in Table A.1, are in line with the literature.
Flat priors are assumed for parameters that can take advantage of the cross-section of countries,
typically those of idiosyncratic processes. Priors for the leverage parameters are perhaps the most
controversial in our context. We found flat prior for leverage parameters to be extremely inefficient
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computationally and decided for mildly informative priors that assign higher probability weight to
negative values of ρ and ρj .
Our prior distributions for the unconditional log-variance of idiosyncratic shocks µih is particu-
larly flat to accommodate the variety of economic profiles in our sample of countries. In addition,





= Beta(1, 1), is flat on the
interval (−1, 1) but there are computational benefits from using a Beta prior instead of Uniform.
A similar strategy was used in Kim et al. (1998).
Economic data for emerging countries tend to be more noisy than those of industrialized
economies and we account for this feature in the estimation of factor loadings by allowing emerg-
ing and industrialized countries to have different levels of precision in the exposure parameter. To
be more specific, let Ii indicate whether country i is emerging. Then the prior distribution for







1, Ii σ2em + (1− Ii)σ2dev
]
σ−2em ∼ Gamma(3, 2)
σ−2dev ∼ Gamma(3, 2).
Figure A.4 depicts the prior and posterior distributions for σ−2em and σ
−2
dev and confirms our suspicion
that noise in output data translates into low precision in the estimation of β’s.
Note that we do not assume ex-ante that the precision of the exposure estimates is different
between emerging and developed countries. Instead, we let the data inform of potential differences
in the precision level through the updating of σ2em and σ
2
dev, for emerging and developed countries,
respectively.
We draw 2·106 samples from the posterior distributions after a burn-in period of 100, 000 draws
and keep every 20th draw to diminish the autocorrelation in the simulated chains. Table A.2 shows
the posterior means and 5- and 95-percentiles of the posterior distributions. A few considerations
are in order. First, volatility is quite persistent, regardless of the source (factor or idiosyncratic).
Second, there is no systematic pattern in the persistence of factors. While the global and Europe
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factors are significantly persistent, the BRICS factor’s persistence is significantly negative - though
moderate in magnitude.
The leverage effect is significant for all three factors and the magnitude of the leverage param-
eter suggests a large portion of the level shocks is carried over to the conditional volatility. For
the purpose of this paper, accounting for the leverage effect allows us to disentangle the portion
of volatility fluctuations caused by exogenous volatility shocks from that spilled over from level
shocks.
The relatively large volatility of log-variance for the global factor corroborates the narrative
implied by Figure A.1, which depicts filtered values for the global factor’s level and volatility.
Throughout the 1960-2017 period, extreme events such as the oil price crisis in 1973, Europe’s
recession in 1982, the recessions in Europe and the U.S. in the early 2000s, and the 2008 financial
crisis are easily recognizable. In addition, Figure A.1 makes a compelling case for time-varying
volatility of the global factor of output growth, as neglecting this feature in the data and imposing a
constant volatility would likely overestimate the volatility level in normal times but underestimate
it in times of global turmoil.
However, important events such as the Russian and Asian crises in the late 1990’s and the
subsequent currency crises that hit Latin America from 1997-2002 are seemingly absent from the
global factor plotted in Figure A.1. A reasonable explanation is that, despite the apparent syn-
chronicity in the crises aforementioned, they were mostly triggered by local/regional rather than
global issues. In addition, Russia, Brazil, Korea and Indonesia, countries that faced severe crises
in the 1998-2002 period, are not significantly exposed to the global factor. Figure A.6 summa-
rizes the posterior distributions of global factor loadings for all countries in the sample. Countries
whose exposure is significantly greater than zero are assigned to the ‘high exposure’ group whereas
countries whose loadings are not significantly greater than zero are assigned to the ‘low exposure’
group. According to this criterion, the group of countries that are highly exposed to the global
factor are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nether-
lands, Spain, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and United States. Australia, Argentina,
Brazil, China, Chile, Indonesia, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Poland and Turkey comprise the
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low exposure group.
1.2.4 Global volatility risk sharing: VAR evidence
Several authors have considered global macro risks as a driver of asset price dynamics (see
Lustig et al. (2011), Corte et al. (2016) and Berg and Mark (2018), to cite a few). Recently,
Colacito et al. (2018) found evidence of heterogeneous exposure to short- and long-run global risk.
Their approach differs from ours as they use the projection of global GDP growth onto the price-
dividend ratio as a proxy for the global component of GDP growth. A similar methodology was
previously adopted by Bansal et al. (2012).
The idea is that the price of assets similarly exposed to a common risk factor tend to move in the
same direction. In our context, exchange and interest rate movements, which depend on country-
specific stochastic discount factors, are impacted differently because the exposure to global volatil-
ity is heterogeneous.
From a highly exposed country’s perspective, a positive shock to the global factor increases the
expected output growth for a long period because of the factor’s high persistence. On the other
hand, negative shocks can have a devastating effect to the country’s welfare since expected output
growth is updated downwards for several years.
To counteract the welfare decline caused by negative shocks to expected growth, countries
may increase consumption in the current period. Since current output is fixed and we abstract from
investment, the only way to increase consumption is through imports.
However, a shock to the volatility of the global factor is, in fact, a mean-preserving spread to
global output growth trend and does not affect the level of growth itself. If global volatility shocks
do not affect the level of expected growth, movements in consumption and asset prices caused by
volatility fluctuations indicate that countries also care about the volatility, and not just the level, of
future output growth.
To check whether macro prices and quantities respond to global volatility shocks, we estimate a






















. For a general latent process ξt, we use the notation ξ̂t|t = E [ξt|It],
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where time-t information set It contains all observables available at time t.
For each group, we stack country-level data series and de-mean each country’s consumption-
output ratio as they can vary significantly across countries. The magnitude of exchange rate fluc-
tuations also varies considerably across countries so we standardize each country’s exchange rate
series by its specific standard deviation.
Interest rates are a bit more challenging. In addition to cross-country variation in first and
second moments, there is also considerable time variation in the level and volatility of interest
rates throughout the sample. The post-2008 period is particularly notable as several countries in the
sample had near-zero interest rates. More importantly, the magnitude of interest rate fluctuations
after 2008 may not be comparable to that of, say, 1980’s and 1990’s. To mitigate these issues,
we standardize interest rates with country-specific moving averages and standard deviations. We
choose a five-year period to roughly approximate the current interest rate regime (length of business
cycle).
The VAR is estimated using Bayesian methods. Our prior distribution for the autocorrelation
matrix is flat-Normal whereas an inverse-Wishart prior is assumed for the covariance of matrix of
residuals. We identify structural shocks via Cholesky decomposition of the residual covariance
matrix, in the spirit of Canova (1991).
Our identification strategy is not innocuous from an interpretative perspective. The Cholesky
decomposition assumes that structural shocks propagate in the same order as the variables in the
autoregression vector.
The direction of causality between first- and second-moment fluctuations is a topic of intense
debate in the literature and a wide consensus is unlikely to emerge. The reason being that the
proxy for volatility itself should guide the choice of identifying assumptions. For instance, Lud-
vigson, Ma, and Ng (2015) find that macroeconomic “uncertainty” is an endogenous response to
first-moment shocks whereas in financial markets volatility seems to cause price-level movements.
Using a narrative approach to select volatility-increasing events, Bloom (2009) finds that the re-
sponse of macro variables to fundamental uncertainty shocks is significant and proposed a model
that rationalizes the observed dynamics.
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In this regard, our goal is to characterize empirically the responses of macro quantities and
prices to global volatility shocks and, consequently, verify the plausibility of our conjecture that
agents price fluctuations in global volatility. From Eq. 1.1, the time-t conditional volatility of the
global factor is updated when new predicted values for ηwt given observed output are available. In
other words, our specification for the evolution of country-level output growth implies that current-









where our notation yt indicates that agents base their predictions for the global factor’s level and
volatility on output growth for all countries in the sample, not just their own, which would be
denoted by yit. News about time-t output growth arrive at the end of period t, hence our notation
in Eq. 1.1.
In reality, agents observe yt and update their predictions for the global factor ηwt based on
output movements that are systematic across countries. The magnitude of the difference between
the updated prediction and previous forecasts for the global factor informs agents about the (time-
varying) volatility of the global factor. For example, if the observed fluctuation in global output
growth is “too large” that it is unlikely that it had been generated by previous predictions for global
volatility, then agents update their prediction for volatility upwards.
Note that shocks to global volatility can be expressed byE
(
hfw,t
∣∣yt, η̂wt|t)−E (hfw,t ∣∣yt−1, η̂wt|t−1),
which is the innovation in the magnitude of the forecast error for the level of the global factor. In
this sense, the global factor’s stochastic volatility allows for time variation in the magnitude of
forecast errors, with the intuitive interpretation that positive volatility shocks indicate that future
global output growth is less predictable.
In our Bayesian framework, E
(
hfw,t
∣∣yt, η̂wt|t) is the posterior mean of hfwt. The filtering pro-
cess implies that time-t output is known when the prediction for ηwt , η̂
w
t|t, is formed and, as stated
in Eq. 1.2, predicted values for hfwt are based on observed output at time t and η̂wt|t. In this sense,
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the Cholesky ordering must reflect each variable’s information set appropriately. Since output data
arrive at the end of the quarter, after consumption and savings decisions have already been made,
shocks to the global factor, which are realized once new output data arrive, can only affect next
period’s choice variables. Hence our choice to to order the autoregression vector with η̂wt|t and ĥ
f
w,t|t
in the last two positions, respectively.
A desirable consequence of the Cholesky ordering chosen is that the influence of first-moment
shocks on global volatility is accounted for in the impulse-responses. Since the level series pre-
cedes volatility in the vector, the contemporaneous effect of level on volatility is controlled for and
the responses are indeed caused by structural volatility shocks.
1.2.5 Impulse-responses and interpretation
Figure A.7 displays the responses to a 1-s.d. shock to global volatility (median response and
90% credibility bounds shown). As global volatility rises, exchange rates in high-exposure coun-
tries appreciate significantly whereas low-exposure countries experience a currency depreciation.
Exchange movements last about four quarters after the realization of the global volatility shock.
Consumption relative to output rises significantly in high-exposure countries and remains above
steady state for decades. Conversely, consumption in low-exposure countries declines significantly
to accommodate the high-exposure countries’ demand for foreign goods.
A lower consumption-output ratio is equivalent to a higher savings rate. We abstract from in-
vestment, so the trade balance is the only channel for savings. In practice, a current account deficit
must be matched by a capital account surplus of the same magnitude. That is, the outflow of goods
experienced by low-exposure countries implies an increase in their asset position in high-exposure
countries, which entitles low-exposure countries to a “cashflow” stream in the future. Since the
Balance of Payment is balanced in every period, the response of capital account is the mirror im-
age of that of the current account and the trade flows imply asset flows of same magnitude in the
opposite direction. The current account’s response to a global volatility shock is also documented
in Figure A.7.
The trade balance in high- (low-) exposure countries moves significantly towards a deficit (sur-
plus) when global volatility rises. These results, in addition to the responses of consumption-output
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ratio, confirm our conjecture that a risk-sharing mechanism is in place: high exposure countries
experience an inflow of foreign goods that enables a smoother utility path at the expense of future
consumption, which is compromised by the consequential increase in indebtedness with respect to
low-exposure countries.
The significant decline in interest rates in both groups is our final evidence that global volatility
affects the countries’ stochastic discount factors. The rise in global volatility triggers precautionary
savings in both groups and the increased demand for risk-free assets exerts downward pressure on
interest rates.
Our theoretical framework in Section 1.4 rationalizes the dynamics of macro quantities and
prices observed in the data. For starters, one must bear in mind that preferences in which the
certainty equivalent of future utility is the expected utility level itself will inevitably fail to explain
volatility-driven fluctuations. Section 1.3 discusses this topic in detail.
1.2.6 Economic implications of factor dynamics
The statistical properties of factors global, Europe and BRICS, summarized in Table A.2, in-
dicate that their dynamics are remarkably different from each other. While the BRICS factor is
highly volatile, with estimated unconditional volatility at 1.08% per annum, fluctuations in the
global factor are typically contained in a much narrower band, as the estimated unconditional
volatility 0.061% implies. The point estimate for the unconditional volatility of the Europe fac-
tor is more than twice that of the global factor at 0.126% but their credibility intervals overlap
significantly and, thus, one cannot say that they are significantly different.
The stark difference between the unconditional volatilities of global and BRICS factors corrob-
orate the idea that large output shocks occur much more frequently in emerging economies than
in their industrialized counterparts - the majority of countries exposed to the global factor. On the
other hand, the impact of shocks to the level of the global factor lingers for decades, whereas level
shocks to the BRICS factor die out within one year of realization. Figure A.3 displays the auto-
correlation functions of AR(1) processes with persistence parameters set to the point estimates of
global (left panel) and BRICS (right panel) factors. Note that six years after the arrival of a global
shock, roughly 50% of the initial pulse is still present in the global factor. In this sense, it is not
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surprising that recoveries from global recessions are notoriously slow.
One can also interpret the factors as common trends in cross-country output growth. Since
output growth is assumed to follow a random walk process with a drift that is composed by a time-
invariant country-specific component µiy and factors that reflect global and regional comovements,
then shocks to the level of factors induce fluctuations in the trend of country-level output growth.
The unit root in output growth implies that factor (and idiosyncratic) shocks are permanent, which
amplifies the welfare cost of output fluctuations. Our estimates, however, suggest that shocks to
the global factor are also long-lived, i.e., global shocks trigger a shift in the trend of country-level
output that lasts several decades.
Processes with these features have been discussed in the long-run risks literature initiated by
Bansal and Yaron (2004). Our specification, however, extends their framework to allow for feed-
back effects captured by the leverage parameter. The strong leverage effect reflected in the negative
and significant estimate ρw = −0.75 reinforces the idea that volatility is higher in recessions, since
negative level shocks are correlated with positive volatility movements.
Leverage effects are also significant for the BRICS factor, though its unconditional volatility
and persistence imply dynamics radically different from that of the global factor. First, the negative
persistence of the BRICS factor implies that output shocks are immediately followed by reversals
in the direction of output growth. While this feature makes recessions shorter, it also implies ex-
pansions are equally ephemerous. Moreover, the estimated unconditional volatility - at least three
times as large as that of the global factor - suggests that fluctuations in the common trend of output
growth in Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are exceptionally large, in some cases
larger than idiosyncratic fluctuations around the trend. In this regard, our findings also corroborate
those of Aguiar and Gopinath (2007).
While the statistical profiles of the estimated factors is important per se, it is noteworthy that
they provide a narrative for the world economy that is consistent with important events that took
place in the past decades. For instance, the global factor correctly captures the unprecedented3
3For the post-World War II period.
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economic downturn following the financial crisis in 2008 and, perhaps more importantly, the pro-
longed influence of global shocks in country-level output growth undoubtedly contributes to our
understanding of the asset prices movements upon the crisis outbreak.
Features of emerging economies are also implicit in the BRICS factor. Frequent and severe but
relatively short recessions, typical of emerging economies, are compatible with a highly volatile
but not persistent common trend. The institutional framework in most emerging countries enables
abrupt shifts in economic policy-making that occur far more often than in industrialized countries.
If these institutional breaks lead to less predictable future economic outcomes, then they can be
thought of as volatility-increasing shocks, which, given the magnitude of the leverage effect, may
lead to recessions by themselves.
To illustrate the institutional disarray in which important emerging countries find themselves
during economic crises, let us consider the 1998 widespread crisis in the developing world. Russia
had a currency crisis that involved a loan from the IMF, defaulted on domestic debt, renegotiated
its foreign debt and, after a 5.3% decline in GDP in 1998, grew 6.3% in 1999. Brazil also faced
difficulties as fiscal leniency in election year forced the government to borrow from the IMF to meet
its obligations. After mediocre growth in 1998 and 1999, Brazil grew 4.1% in 2000, only to face
a confidence crisis two years later. If we extend our analysis to non-BRICS countries but, instead,
interpret the BRICS factor as a proxy for the economic dynamics of emerging economies then the
crises in Argentina and Indonesia are also informative. Several Asian countries faced a currency
crisis in 1997-1998, but in Indonesia’s case, the economic turmoil led to an institutional break as
president Suharto resigned in May 1998. Argentina’s case is perhaps the most extreme among
the countries mentioned because GDP plunged about 19% between 1998-2002. The institutional
chaos peaked in January 2002, when five different presidents were sworn in within a two-weeks
period. From 2003 to 2007, Argentina’s economy grew on average 8.75% per year.
Examples of severe crises followed by strong growth are abundant in emerging economies.
Sometimes institutional breaks lead to economic expansions, but recessions are more often the
outcome, or culprit, of the deterioration in predictability of economic conditions. In this sense, the
tight link between economic growth and volatility in emerging countries is somewhat embodied in
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the properties of the BRICS factor.
Naturally, agents that make consumption and savings decisions in an environment such as the
one described above, with domestic and foreign/global sources of risk, pay very close attention to
the dynamics of factors and idiosyncratic fluctuations. Since the parameters that characterize the
stochastic processes driving output dynamics are estimated, agents must, at the very least, account
for the uncertainty intrinsic to econometric procedures when they base their decisions on estimated
parameters. Moreover, even if the econometric results seem to fit the data adequately, the true data
generating process is unknown to the econometrician. In this sense, our empirical model, like all
models, is misspecified. Section 1.3 discusses how agents can, using our empirical results as a
benchmark, make decisions that are robust to model misspecification.
1.3 Discussion
Our empirical results make a compelling case for time-varying volatility of factors, in particular
the global factor. Had we assumed time-invariant volatility, shocks of magnitude several times as
large4 as the unconditional volatility of the global factor would have happened in a few decades
time. Time-varying volatility allows us to accommodate these large shifts in global output growth
trend in a more natural way. There are, however, conceptual implications and empirical challenges
that arise with a stochastic volatility specification.
To illustrate some of the conceptual implications, consider an agent making consumption and
saving decisions in the late 1990’s. From Figure A.1, the world had endured about two decades
of relative tranquility and one could not help but think that volatile times as the 1970’s were all
but gone. Suppose the agent is sure that the global economy entered a new regime in 1980’s -
say, the global Great Moderation - and makes decisions as if the new regime is permanent. Her
decisions would probably be different from those of an agent who is unsure whether the moderation
is permanent or that the world was just lucky for a couple of decades. The latter agent would
undoubtedly be more cautious than the former in her consumption/savings decisions.
Note that both agents have access to the same data but their disagreement about their ability
4The output shock for the 2008 financial crisis, for example, was about eight times as large as the unconditional
volatility of the global factor.
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to approximate the true data generating process led to different consumption and savings rules. If
we fast-forward to 2018 and both agents convince themselves that the frequency and clustering of
large shocks makes a model with time-invariant volatility implausible, the cautious agent may still
want to make decisions that do not rely completely on their model5 perfectly replicating the data
generating process.
In this sense, the cautious agent wants consumption and savings decisions rules that are robust
over a set of models close to the one they estimated, which we will refer to as the benchmark model.
In other words, the agent views the estimated model as an approximation to the true d.g.p. and
wants decision rules that are robust under unspecified models that deviate from their benchmark
model.
The idea that one must account for the possibility that not only the parameters within a model
may be inaccurate but that the model itself may be misspecified dates back to Knight (1921) and
Savage (1955). More recently, Hansen and Sargent (2008) brought attention to the relevance of
this literature to modern Economics with successful applications to Macroeconomics and Finance.
To discuss these concepts in detail, let us first introduce some notation. Let st denote the state




denote the agent’s benchmark model, that is, her best approximation to the probability distribution




The agent has p0(·) and wants decision rules that are optimal under a variety of models p(·)
that are “close” to p0. The key feature of these robust choice models is that p(·) is unspecified,
that is, p(·) is not a competitive empirical model against which we compare p0. Instead, the agent
considers an array of models that are small deviations from the benchmark. Optimal decision rules
that are robust within the set of alternative models considered must be optimal under the worst-case
scenario, defined as the model p(·) that yields the lowest expected utility.
In practice, optimal decision rules maximize utility under a probability measure p(·) that min-
imizes expected utility. More specifically, optimal decision rules for consumption C(s) maximize
5A model here is a probability distribution that governs state transitions.
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utility U given by


















denotes the state-space, u(·) is period utility and δ is the time discount factor. Parameter θ will be
discussed shortly.
Abstracting from the state space to make the notation simpler, the first term in the minimization
problem in Eq. 1.3,
∫
U(s′|s)m(s′|s) p0(s′|s)ds′, can be simplified to
∫
U(s′|s) p(s′|s)ds′, which is
the expected utility under the alternative model Ep [U(s′)|s]. The m(s′|s) that minimizes expected






log [m(s′|s)] m(s′|s) p0(s′|s)ds′, is described by Hansen and Sargent
(2008) as the entropy measure of discrepancy between the benchmark model and its alternative
p(·). Note that the Kullback-Leibler (K-L) distance between two probability measures p1 and p2







.Then K-L distance between the benchmark and alternative models is
given by



















log [m(s)] m(s) p0(s)ds,
which is the entropy discrepancy discussed above. Naturally, we assume p0(s) > 0 ∀ s.
Since p0 is the model that fits the data best, one could think of the entropy discrepancy as a
measure of empirical plausibility of alternative models. Parameter θ will determine how far from p0
the agent is willing to consider when making the decision rule. In other words, and perhaps rather
informally, θ determines the “size” of the set of alternative models in which the agent searches
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for her worst scenario. For instance, if θ = ∞, then the decision rule will be optimal for the
worst-case scenario among all alternatives, regardless of its empirical bearing. If θ = 0, then even
slight discrepancies between p and p0 will make the agent find p too implausible and the only
alternative that survives is p(s′|s) = p0(s′|s) ∀ s′. In that case, m(s′|s) in Eq. 1.3 reduces to 1 and
the minimization problem, evaluated at the minimum, collapses to Ep0 [U(s
′|s)], which is standard
expected utility.
Moderate values of θ make the most relevant cases, when the agent has to balance her fear
of misspecification and the empirical plausibility of the worst-case scenario. For this reason, θ is
referred to as the preference for robustness parameter in the literature.






exp {−θ U (st+1|st)}
Et [exp {−θ U (st+1|st)}]
.
Time-t utility from Eq. 1.3, evaluated at the solution to the minimization problem, can be
written as










Unlike standard expected utility, in which current period’s utility is a function of current con-
sumption and next period’s expected utility, agents with robust preferences derive utility from
risk-adjusted expected utility. In other words, the certainty equivalent of next-period’s utility is
expected utility itself in the case of standard expected utility preferences whereas preference for
robustness introduces curvature in next-period’s utility that yields a non-negative utility-risk pre-
mium.
In this context, mean-preserving spreads in the consumption dynamics do not affect welfare
under expected utility because the expected level of future consumption is unaffected. In other
words, agents with expected utility preferences are utility-risk neutral.
On the other hand, mean-preserving spreads in the consumption process are penalized by an
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agent with robust preferences through the certainty equivalent of the concave function derived
in the solution to Eq. 1.3. To make this point clear, suppose, for the sake of the argument,
that one could guess a functional form for time-t continuation utility Ut = au + bu σεt, where











= au − 0.5 θ b2u σ2.
Note that high values of σ lead to lower continuation utility Ut. In other words, agents with robust
preferencs are utility-risk averse. This feature is crucial to replicate the empirical responses to
volatility shocks in a theoretical framework.
1.3.1 Robust disagreement
Since the goal of robust preferences is to obtain decision rules that are optimal under a distorted
version of the benchmark model, subjective and objective state probabilities will differ. Note from





Et [e−θ Ut+1 ]
is precisely the distortion m (st+1|st) that
yields the worst-case scenario for our agent. That is, the agent assigns higher probability to states
in which her marginal utility is higher.
In this sense, we say that the agent chooses a decision rule that is robust in a set of unspecified
models because the alternative model uses the benchmark as a starting point but slants higher
probability weight towards high-marginal-utility states.
In a multi-agent setting, a given state may be good for a set of agents but bad for another
and marginal utility will vary across agents. Even if all agents agree on the benchmark model,
same objective state probability p0 (st+1|st), subjective probability p0 (st+1|st)
e−θ U(st+1|s
t)
Et [e−θ Ut+1 ]
will
vary across agents and those relatively worse off will assign higher probability weight to state
st+1. This allows for subjective probabilities that vary across agents even if they share the same
benchmark model (objective probability), that is, agents disagree on the state probabilities as each
agent will assign higher probability mass to their personal high-marginal-utility states.
This endogenous disagreement among agents has important implications for asset prices and
macro quantities. Colacito and Croce (2012), for instance, discuss a two-agent model in which one
agent’s high-endowment (low marginal utility) state is the other’s low-endowment (high marginal
utility) state. While the physical probability of that state’s occurrence is fixed, their perceived
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probability is different as their marginal utilities distort the objective probability.
In our context, agents’ output streams have idiosyncratic and global components. Naturally,
the global component is the theoretical counterpart of the global factor discussed in the previous
sections. In line with our empirical results, we assume that the exposure to the global component
is heterogeneous across agents. When positive output shocks arrive to global component, the agent
with highest exposure is in a comparatively better state - lower marginal utility - relative to the
other agent. Conversely, when bad news about the global economy arrive, the low-exposure agent
will be relatively better off. Since marginal utility is the channel through which robust preferences
introduce cross-agent variation in subject probabilities, second-moment fluctuations affect prices
and quantities because the agents’ preferences are sensitive to volatility.
We propose a theoretical risk-sharing model in Section 1.4 in which agents with robust pref-
erences mitigate the welfare impact of volatility shocks via foreign trade, as observed in the data.
Our model predictions for interest and exchange rate are also supported by the data.
1.4 Theoretical framework
Our model economy is composed by two agents, home (h) and foreign (f ). The home agent
receives an endowment stream of good X whereas the foreign agent receives an endowment of
good Y . Both agents derive utility from consumption of goods X and Y . We denote the time-t
home and foreign demand functions for good X by xht and xft. Analogously, yht and yft denote
the home and foreign demands for good Y in period t. Aggregators Cht and Cft summarize each











where parameter α tunes the degree of home bias in consumption.
We denote the home and foreign agents’ endowment streams by {Xt}∞t=−∞ and {Yt}
∞
t=−∞.
Endowment streams are subject to idiosyncratic agent-specific fluctuations and a global compo-
nent, which we refer to as “global factor” as it is empirically motivated by our econometric results.
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Since we focus on the business cycle implications of global volatility fluctuations, we assume that
innovations to the global factor are subject to time-varying volatility. Exposure to the global factor
is governed by parameters βh and βf , for “home” and “foreign” respectively.
To make our exposition clear, let us denote the global factor by ηwt and the time-t log-variance
of the global innovations by σ2wt. Then the output dynamics of our model economy follow
Endowment processes:
log (Xt) = (1− φ)µ+ φ log (Xt−1) + βh ηwt−1 + σ εx,t+1
log (Yt) = (1− φ)µ+ φ log (Yt−1) + βf ηwt−1 + σ εy,t+1 (1.5)
Global factor:




σ2wt = (1− φwσ )µwσ + φwσ σ2w,t−1 + ρw σwσ εwt + σwσ εσwt.
Except for the persistence of endowment levels φ, which we set to a value close to but lower
than 1, all other parameters are set to their estimated counterparts from Table A.2. Had we assumed
a unit root φ = 1, the model would have to be solved in growth rates at the expense of consumption-
output ratios readily comparable to those observed in the data. We set φ = 0.99, which yields
short-run dynamics similar enough to those of a unit-root process with the benefits of stationary
dynamics and model solution in levels.
Our representative agents want consumption rules that are robust to misspecification of Eq. 1.5.
In line with our previous discussion in Section 1.3, time-t home and foreign preferences are given
by



















where δ denotes the time-discount factor and θ determines the preference for robustness.
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We assume markets are complete and goods are traded freely across agents. Our solution
method follows Anderson (2005).
1.4.1 Model solution: pseudo-Pareto weights and optimal allocations
A solution to our model is a sequence of allocations {xht, xft, yht, yft}∞t=0 that are feasible
and maximize social welfare at time 0. Let ωh and ωf denote the Pareto weights assigned to the
home and foreign agents by the social planner. Again, we denote the history of realized states up
to period t by st. The planner’s problem is
Max
{xht, xft, yht, yft}∞
t=0


























Anderson (2005) and Colacito and Croce (2012) point out that allocations can be characterized
in terms of “pseudo-Pareto” weights, ωht(st) and ωft(st), that summarize history st. Specifi-
cally, since preferences are not time separable, prices and allocations at time t depends on the














































α + (1− α)ϕt(st)
Yt(s
t)




∣∣st) = ϕt(st) e−θ Uh,t+1







The detailed solution to the planner’s problem is available in Appendix A.1.2.
Note that an increase in ϕt(·) implies that a larger share of world consumption goods is diverted
to the home agent. The mechanism works as follows: given history of realized states up to t, the
ratio of e−θ Uh,t+1 and e−θ Uf,t+1 (scaled by previous expectations about current utility) indicates
which of the agents have a better draw in period t + 1, tilting ϕt+1(st+1) towards the agent with




are known quantities as of the
beginning of period t + 1 so all new information about ϕt+1(·) must come from Uh,t+1(st+1) and
Uf,t+1(st+1).
The most important feature of the model is that pseudo-Pareto weights also respond to second-
moment shocks6. To counteract the welfare loss caused by the volatility shock, in the current
period, the ratio of pseudo-Pareto weights slants world consumption towards the agent in the rel-
atively worse state. Continuation utility in a robust choice setting is akin to expected utility under
the distorted subjective probability measure. Since a rise in volatility makes agents assign higher
probability to bad states, their expected utility is lower than it would have been under standard
time-separable preference.
To clarify why standard expected utility fails to account for the impact of second-moment









for any history st, given initial state s0. In this environment, the ratio of pseudo-Pareto weights is
ϕt = 1 for any possible history st. Under log-period utility such as our benchmark model, ϕt = 1
implies a constant share of world endowment is allocated to each agent7 regardless of movements
in volatility.
Since the channel through which second-moment shocks affect allocations under robust pref-
erences is marginal utility, macroeconomic prices will also be sensitive to volatility fluctuations.





around Et Ui,t+1 yields
Uit = (1− δ) log(Cit) + δ
[
Et (Ui,t+1)− θ2Vt (Ui,t+1)
]
.
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1.4.2 Macroeconomic prices: terms of trade, exchange and interest rates
Terms of trade. Optimality conditions in the decentralized version of our model imply that
the marginal rate of substitution between the domestic and imported goods must equal the ratio of









α + (1− α)ϕt




where p̃t is the relative price of good Y in terms of good X .
From the equation above, if the amount of good Xt available in state st is greater than that of
good Y , then the latter will become relatively more expensive. If, instead, good Y is more plentiful
in the drawn state, then good Y commands a relatively lower price. From the equation above, the
steady-state terms of trade is the unconditional relative supply of good X . In other words, first-
moment shocks are standard supply shocks and the good in relatively lower supply commands
higher price.
Since we abstract from idiosyncratic time-varying volatility, the global factor is the only chan-
nel through which second-moment fluctuations affect the agents’ welfare. Aside from the dynamics
of global risk, home bias in consumption and the level of exposure to the global factor also play a
crucial role in the dynamics of terms of trade.
Let us assume, for the time being, that α = 0.95 and 0 ≤ βf < βh. In this case, when global
volatility rises, the home country is in a relatively worse state vis-à-vis the foreign and the higher
marginal utility in the former raises the ratio of pseudo-Pareto weights so that a larger share of
world consumption is diverted to the home country.
One can also interpret the risk-sharing mechanism as the rise in global volatility triggering an
increase in the demand for consumption goods to mitigate the welfare cost of higher global risk.
While the demand for consumption rises in both countries the home agent’s higher exposure to
the global factor implies her welfare is affected more intensely and, consequently, her demand
for consumption goods is higher that of the foreign country. However, the home bias implied by
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α = 0.95 indicates her consumption is heavily concentrated on good X . Since volatility shocks
do not affect the aggregate supply of goods X or Y , the higher demand for good X will drive its
price upwards. Figure A.10 shows the response of the relative price of Y , p̃t, to a 1-s.d. shock to
global volatility. Note that good Y becomes relatively less expensive for several quarters even as
its aggregate supply remained unchanged throughout the whole period.
Figure A.10 also shows that responses of utility ∂ Ut ∂ Ut+1 and marginal utility to a 1-s.d.
shock to global volatility (panels Utility and Measure distortion, respectively). Because both agents
derive utility from the home and foreign-endowed goods, marginal utility rises - and utility declines
- in both countries when global risk rises.
To understand the extent to which home bias affects the response of the terms of trade to




(1− α)2 − α2
(1− α + αϕt)2
Xt
Yt
is negative (positive) for values of α
greater (lesser) than 0.5. Moreover, the higher the degree of home bias, the greater the effect of
ϕt on terms of trade. If α = 0.5, there is no home bias in consumption and the demand for both
domestic and imported goods rises in lockstep. Hence the negligible response of terms of trade to
a global volatility shock displayed in Figure A.13.
Under no home bias, even if the endowment stream of good X is more exposed to the global
factor, because both agents’ tastes towardsX and Y are indistinguishable - in the sense of marginal
utility, X and Y are not perfect substitutes - a rise in global volatility is perceived as an increase in
non-diversifiable risk with identical welfare costs for both agents (see panels “Utility” and “Mea-
sure distortion” in Figure A.13 for the responses of continuation and marginal utilities to a global
volatility shock). Section 1.4.3 discusses risk-sharing implications of home bias in detail.
The idea of global volatility as a non-diversifiable source of risk is also present in a homogeneous-
exposure setting. If βh = βf , then a rise in global volatility affects the endowment streams of both
countries with the same magnitude. The welfare cost of the rise global risk is identical across coun-
tries and, therefore, no Pareto-improving allocation via trade is available. The responses of welfare
measures and macro prices to an increase in global risk under homogeneous exposure βh = βf are
displayed in Figure A.12.
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Pricing contingent claims. Since exchange and interest rates can be written in terms of redun-
dant asset prices, we first characterize the prices of contingent claims to future output. To that end,
let 1{st+1| st} indicate whether state st+1 is drawn in period t+ 1 given realized history st.
If Mht and Mft denote the stochastic discount factors for the home and foreign agents, then the











Because indicating function 1{st+1| st} assigns zero to all states except st+1, the price of the
Arrow-Debreu security that pays off in state st+1 collapses to qt (st+1|st) = Mh,t+1(st+1|st) p0 (st+1|st),
where p0(·) is the state probability under the model described in Eq. 1.5.












. We report pricing kernels in terms of one good rather than con-
sumption Cht or Cft as the “price” of one unit of consumption is, in fact, a price index that depends
on the price of goods X and Y in a nonlinear fashion. In addition, the macro variables in our
model economy are reported from the home agent’s perspective to make the transition between
our empirical results, in which all variables are measured in U.S. dollars, and model predictions as
straightforward as possible.




































is identical to the stochastic discount factor







probability weight to states in which marginal utility is high. Since this term is sensitive to risk,
28
assets that pay in high-volatility states command a higher price than under expected utility.
If we think of contingent claims that pay off in high-volatility states as a form of insurance
against volatility risk, then we can interpret the higher price of such assets as resulting from the
precautionary savings behavior prompted by the agents’ fear of model misspecification. Natu-
rally, the persistence of the volatility process plays a crucial role in the price of contingent claims
because if volatility is persistent, then a rise in volatility in the current period increases the pre-
dicted volatility for a long period, which, in turn, raises the price of contingent claims that pay in
high-volatility states for several periods.
While contingent claims to output are not traded and, therefore, no prices are formed, the effect
of fluctuations in global volatility is reflected in the price of risk-free assets.
Interest rates. An asset that entitles its holder to one unit of good X one period ahead regard-
less of the state drawn is, in fact, a portfolio of contingent claims for all possible states. Such asset
will be referred to as the risk-free asset and its price denoted by Qxt (s
t).
If the law of one price holds, then the price of a portfolio of assets is the sum of the prices of all
assets contained in that portfolio. Hence, the price of the risk-free asset is Qxt (s
t) = Et (Mh,t+1).
By the same token, the price of an asset that pays off one unit of good Y for the foreign agent is
Qyt (s
t) = Et (Mf,t+1).
From the forward-looking nature of asset prices, higher expected volatility in the future in-
creases the demand for risk-free assets in the current period. That is, if global volatility rises today
and agents expect the rise to last for a few periods, then their higher demand for safe assets will
drive interest rates down.
Since the agents’ forecast for future volatility is based on the properties of the stochastic volatil-
ity process, the persistence of global volatility has a significant role in the dynamics of interest
rates. If volatility shocks are expected to linger for a long time, then a rise in global risk today
indicates marginal utility will be high for many subsequent periods.
To illustrate the role of volatility persistence in the dynamics of interest rates, Figure A.14
depicts the paths of interest rates in the aftermath of a 1-s.d. rise in global volatility for persistence
values φηh = 0.88 and φ
η
h = 0.95. While the values for persistence are relatively close, their
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implications for interest rates are significantly different, suggesting that interest rates are highly
sentitive to the persistence of global risk. To put the values in perspective, the 90% credibility
bounds for the estimated persistence of latent factors were [0.786, 0.964].
Figure A.10 shows the responses of interest rates to a global volatility shock in the home and
foreign countries - measured in terms of good X . The path of interest rates is identical for both
countries even under heterogeneous exposure to the global factor (βh 6= βf ) because both agents
derive utility from both goods. While this feature seems surprising at first, note that the identical
responses of interest rates do not imply that the path for the stochastic discount factors are also
identical but, instead, that the expected value of stochastic discount factors one period ahead is
the same across countries. The “surprise” effect on stochastic discount factors is different across
countries, if exposure levels are different, but this feature is reflected on the response of exchange
rates.
Exchange rates. The complete markets assumption, coupled with the law of one price allows
for the characterization of exchange rates in terms of stochastic discount factors. Specifically, if







, where MXh,t+1 and M
Y
f,t+1 denote the home and foreign agents’
stochastic discount factors in terms of their domestic good. See Appendix A.1.3 for a more detailed
description of the determination of exchange rates .
Since our model economy abstracts from non-tradable goods, exchange rate movements reflect
changes in the relative price of tradable goods and, therefore, are inevitably tied to the terms of
trade. In fact, careful inspection of the expression for exchange rate growth as ratio of stochastic







Nevertheless, mapping exchange rate movements to the ratio of stochastic discount factors re-
inforces the idea that country in a relatively worse state experiences an exchange rate appreciation.
In the context of economies that are heterogeneously exposed to global volatility risk, fluctuations
in global volatility will have implications for the exchange rate that resemble those of terms of
8Also available in Appendix A.1.3.
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trade.
1.4.3 Global volatility-risk sharing: replicating empirical impulse-responses
As discussed in Section 1.2.4, the data indicate that countries that are highly exposed to the
global factor experience a currency appreciation and a deterioration of their current account po-
sitions when global volatility rises. Moreover, we also pointed out that the movement towards a
deficit in the trade balance may be interpreted as a net outflow of assets due to the capital account
surplus of the same magnitude. Put in simple terms, the rise in current consumption to counteract
the welfare cost of higher global volatility comes at the expense of future consumption, as the asset
outflow entitles the rest of the world to a stream of future payoffs in the form of dividends, bond
coupons and etc.
It is important, however, to analyze the responses of trade balance and exchange rates in light
of home bias in consumption. To be specific, first note in Figure A.7 that a small increase in
consumption-output ratio in high-exposure countries is matched by a significantly larger decline in
consumption relative to output in low-exposure countries. Since consumption and output are mea-
sured in U.S. dollars, which appreciate in times of high global volatility, the apparent discrepancy
in the magnitude of responses across groups is due partially to relative-price effects. In the context
of our model economy, and treating the high-exposure group as the ‘home’ agent, consumption-
output ratios CY ht and CY
f
t and trade balances TBht and TB
f
t for the home and foreign agents as
measured in the data are given by
CY ht =
xht + p̃t yht
Xt
and CY ft =
xft + p̃t yft
p̃t Yt
TBht =
xft − p̃t yht
Xt
and TBft =
p̃t yht − xft
p̃t Yt
.
If countries are biased towards their domestic good - that is, if α > 0.5 - then a rise in global
volatility makes good X relatively more expensive. This movement in the relative price of home
and foreign goods is evident in the decline in p̃t shown in Figures A.9, A.10 and A.11, which
depict the model-implied responses of macro quantities and prices under α = 0.8, α = 0.95 and
α = 0.98, for agents with exposure βh = 1.2 and βf = 0. Note that the magnitude of the response
31
of exchange rates9 increases as agents’ consumption becomes more biased towards their domestic
good. This result is not surprising as the rise in global volatility makes the home agent relatively
worse off and, consequently, her higher demand for consumption goods to smooth the welfare cost
of higher volatility raises the aggregate demand for goodX more than it does for good Y . As home
bias gets closer to 1, the marginal utility from consumption of good X is extraordinarily higher
than from good Y , which makes the home agent consume a higher share of her own endowment
instead of exporting to the foreign agent.
The combined movement of quantities - home agent consumes a higher share of her own en-
dowment - and prices - good Y becomes less expensive vis-à-vis good X - raises the consumption-
output ratio in the home country. An analogous argument can be made for the foreign country:
consumption of the imported good declines and her preferred good becomes relatively less expen-
sive, hence the decline in consumption relative to output.
The response of trade balance also reflects the appreciation of the home country’s currency. In
the data, the magnitude of the improvement in the trade balance of low-exposure countries is larger
than the deterioration in those highly exposed. To discuss how our model economy replicates this
feature, note that our theoretical global economy is a closed system, hence one country’s trade
deficit is the other’s surplus, if we focus on quantities exclusively. However, when measured in
terms of the home country’s currency, even small declines in the home agent’s exports xft will
have a large negative impact in her current account. The rise in demand for imported good yht
also contributes to a deterioration of the home agent’s trade balance position though higher levels
of home bias stifle her demand for good Y . Naturally, if the increase in demand for the imported
good is hampered by home bias, then the share of future consumption needed to repay the foreign
country is inevitably smaller than under low home bias.
While a strong home bias implies that a smaller fraction of future consumption is compromised,
it also hinders effective risk-sharing. Note from Figures A.9, A.10 and A.11 that the path of utility
in the aftermath of a global volatility shock indicates that the impact of volatility shocks on welfare
9Exchange rate growth is quantitatively identical to the growth in terms of trade.
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increases as home bias is intensified. For instance, if home bias is (unrealistically) low at α = 0.8
then the effect of a rise in volatility is almost identical for both home and foreign agents (see panel
‘Utility’ in Figure A.9). On the other hand, if α = 0.98, then the home country bears a much larger
share of the welfare cost of a rise in volatility (see panel ‘Utility’ in Figure A.11).
If agents are not biased towards their domestic good - i.e., α = 0.5 - then home and foreign
agents equally share the welfare cost of a rise in volatility. This feature is clear from Figure A.13 as
panel ‘Measure distortion’, which depicts the marginal utilities ∂ Ut/∂ Ut+1 for both agents, shows
that the path of marginal utilities is identical for both agents. Even if the exposure to the global
factor is heterogeneous across agents, in the absence of home bias, agents perceive global risk as
aggregate and non-diversifiable.
1.5 Concluding remarks
From an empirical standpoint, our contribution is threefold. First, we document that output co-
movements across countries can be captured by latent factors and that the global factor resembles
a long-run risk process due to its high persistence and the small magnitude of its fluctuations.
Moreover, we find strong evidence of time variation in the volatility the global factor, as spikes
in global volatility coincide with important events in the world economy such as the oil price and
the 2008 Financial crises. Second, our results suggest that countries are heterogeneously exposed
to the global factor. Third, we find that fluctuations in global volatility have significant effects on
international business cycles as consumption, foreign trade, exchange and interest rates respond
to movements in global volatility. More importantly, the data indicate that the responses of macro
quantities and prices depend on the level of exposure to the global factor. The significance and
shape of responses are robust to different identification strategies (see Figures A.7 and A.8.
We then propose a theoretical model in which agents fear model misspecification and want
decision rules that are optimal in a set of models that are close to their benchmark. Section 1.3
described how the agents’ cautious behavior when making consumption and savings decisions al-
lows us to account for the significant response of macroeconomic prices and quantities to volatility
shocks. Our model successfully replicates the volatility-driven dynamics observed in the data and
rationalizes the global volatility-risk sharing mechanism that enables countries to attain a smoother
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utility profile.
In light of the increasing participation of emerging economies in global markets, a pertinent
extension to our paper is one in which the countries’ exposure to the global business cycles also
varies over time. Del Negro and Otrok (2008) document that the country-specific exposure to the
global factor does change over time though their analysis focus on OECD members only. Since
our results suggest that emerging countries are important players in a global-risk sharing setting,
enriching their data set with developing economies seems a promising road despite the empirical
challenges posed by the limited data availability typical of emerging countries.
Another potential extension to our work is the addition of a non-tradable sector in the model
economy. As the share of Manufacturing in GDP in most industrialized countries has steadily
declined in recent years while the Services sector grows increasingly important, the ability of
countries to share global risk via foreign trade becomes somewhat limited. In this sense, more
research in new channels for global risk sharing of great importance.
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CHAPTER 2
STATE-DEPENDENT ADJUSTMENT COST AND LABOR DYNAMICS IN RECESSIONS:
EVIDENCE USING FGTS POLICY IN BRAZIL
2.1 Introduction
Labor adjustment plays a crucial role in many real business cycle models. Many studies either
have labor free to adjust or having some form of inertia. Commonly modeled inertia include muted
responses of labor to productivity shocks or even inaction when the benefits of an increase in the
number of workers is relatively small. However, the three most recent economic recessions in
Brazil pose a challenge to standard models of labor adjustment as the dynamics of labor varied
considerably across recessions and subsequent recoveries. While unemployment rose sharply in
the 2002 recession, it barely increased in the 2009 recession but the economy recovered quickly
from both downturns with strong labor and wage growth. On the other hand, unemployment peaked
after the 2014-2016 depression was over and roughly two years after recession’s end, labor level
has yet to recover. We argue that the job severance policy in Brazil can explain the observed
labor dynamics and propose a theoretical framework in which we treat the severance penalty as a
labor adjustment cost. Our model accurately predicts that recessions preceded by long expansions
impact labor levels more severely than downturns following shorter economic booms. Also, the
state dependence property of our adjustment cost allows us to replicate the delay between the
beginning of an economic downturn and the trough in the formal-sector labor level, a feature
observed in the 2014-2016 depression in Brazil.
Typical specifications for the adjustment costs are quadratic adjustment (Sargent 1978), fixed
and piece-wise linear adjustment cost (Cooper and Willis 2009; Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Willis
2015) and disruption of the production process (Cooper, Haltiwanger, and Power 1999). Brazil’s
regulatory environment is particularly strict about worker termination and imposes a severance
penalty that depends on the worker’s tenure and past wages. In this sense, we focus on the cost
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of labor contractions - departing from a symmetrical labor adjustment specification, and parsimo-
niously incorporate the history of realized states on an aggregate level. The idea for modeling
labor adjustment in this manner is motivated by the Brazilian FGTS policy implemented in 1963.
To explain aforementioned economic recessions, the adjustment cost must not only account for the
inertial features implied by the FGTS policy but also incorporate the economic conditions leading
up to said episodes. This state-dependent nature of our model sets us apart from previous studies.
The FGTS policy - Warranty Fund for Time of Service, in free translation - consists of a manda-
tory savings account that each worker is assigned when they join the workforce in Brazil. When
formally employed, the firm is required to invest an additional 8% of a month’s pay in their em-
ployees’ FGTS account every month. If the employer decides to terminate a worker without legal
justification, it must pay a penalty that amounts to 50% of the balance accrued during the em-
ployee’s tenure.
According to Brazil’s labor laws, contracts signed directly between employer and employee are
not legally binding and firms cannot circumvent the FGTS requirement. Because of the inflexibility
in the determination of labor relations, firms proceed quite cautiously when they hire new workers
and a considerable portion of the workforce resorts to the informal sector as they cannot find jobs
in the formal sector. Informal jobs account for about 40% of aggregate employment.
It is worth mentioning that some nuances introduced by the FGTS are not trivial to account
for in a model economy even at the aggregate level. First, workforce declines of the same mag-
nitude may have different termination penalties, depending on the state of the economy. Hence,
approaches such as Caballero, Engel, and Haltiwanger (1997), who assume that the cost of ad-
justment is proportional to the size of the adjustment, or Cooper and Willis (2009), who consider
a fixed adjustment cost among other specifications, cannot account for this feature. Second, even
adjustment cost specifications that account for the state of the economy in the spirit of Cooper et al.
(1999), in which the adjustment cost is augmented by the opportunity cost of profits forgone with
the interruption of the production process, will not fully capture the exceptional behavior of labor
adjustment cost induced by the FGTS policy. In a disruption-model of labor adjustment, it is costly
to adjust labor when productivity is high but recessions provide windows of opportunity to adjust
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the labor level as the adjustment cost is relatively low.1 Under the FGTS policy, the crucial factor
that determines the magnitude of the termination penalty is not the current productivity level, but
the history of previous wage rates and labor levels, which is summarized by the aggregate FGTS
holdings.
In this sense, we propose a two-sector model that resembles the formal and informal sectors in
Brazil’s economy. The formal sector firm is subject to a termination penalty in the spirit of that im-
plied by the FGTS whereas the informal sector firm chooses labor in a frictionless environment. We
assume a representative household supplies labor elastically to both formal and informal sectors.
While the representative household assumption is convenient for our empirical treatment, it rules
out the worker-specific job tenure that determines the magnitude of the termination penalty. We
tackle this issue by means of aggregate FGTS holdings that evolve according to formal-sector’s
wage and labor level. When the formal-sector firm downsizes its workforce, it incurs a penalty
proportional to the current aggregate FGTS balance at the time. Our approach is interesting for
additional reasons. One, aggregate wage and labor data for the formal sector is readily available
on a monthly basis since 1998. Two, like any private financial information, worker-level FGTS
holdings are confidential but the government-owned bank that operates the FGTS accounts posts
regular transparency reports that inform FGTS’s aggregate positions.
We estimate structural parameters in a Bayesian framework similar to that of Smets and Wouters
(2007) and Schorfheide, Song, and Yaron (2018). With estimated values for the adjustment cost,
proportion of aggregate FGTS holdings paid when formal-sector labor declines 1%, and param-
eters that drive the dynamics of total factor productivity, we simulate model-implied paths that
resemble the three most recent recessions in Brazil (see Section 2.6 for further details).
We compare our model predictions to those of a quadratic adjustment cost following Sargent
(1978) and find that the state dependency embodied in the aggregate FGTS holdings alter the
severity of recessions and subsequent recovery time, a feature that the quadratic adjustment model
fails to replicate.
1In the context of Brazil’s economy, the disruptive-type of adjustment cost would perhaps be more appropriate to
model the cost of search and training new workers, which is beyoned the scope of this paper.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the patterns in labor market dynamics
we want to account for. Section 2.3 discusses the particular features that makes Brazil’s labor mar-
ket unique and how these characteristics should guide the design of our model economy. Section
2.4 discusses the model. Section 2.5 describes the data, estimation details and results. We discuss
in Section 2.6 how the model sheds light on the three most recent recessions in Brazil.
2.2 Motivation
This paper is motivated by the somewhat paradoxical dynamics of labor in the recoveries of
2004 and 2010, in which labor adjusted promptly as economic conditions improved, and 2017,
in which high unemployment outlasted the recession and peaked one year after the recession was
over. In particular, we are interested in the conditions that enabled the flexibility in the adjustment
of the labor level in the first two recoveries but led to significant inertia in the most recent.
To put the recent history of Brazil’s economic performance in perspective, the economy dis-
played mediocre growth between 1997 and 2003, with isolated events of output decline. In partic-
ular, the Asian and Russian crises in 1997 and 1998, and Argentina’s sovereign default in 2001 had
significant effects on Brazil’s economic outcome. While there is a plethora of reasons for Brazil’s
overall economic expansion between the late 1990’s and 2002 despite unfavorable international
conditions, it is worth noting that the expansion did not translate in strong labor and wage growth.
In fact, the unemployment rate reached 12% in the short recession in 2003 and real wages were
close to their lowest levels since 1996.
The poor conditions in the labor market set the stage for a strong recovery that started in 2004
and would last nearly a decade - despite the brief interruption in 2009Q1-2009Q3. Labor and
wages responded immediately as the economy entered a path of strong growth with labor and
wages rising sharply in both formal and informal sectors.
Similarly, in the brief recession that followed the 2008 financial crisis, labor and wages declined
significantly during the recession but recovered quickly as conditions improved in the last quarter
of 2009. By mid-2010, labor and wages were roughly back to pre-crisis levels.
Unlike the previous recessions, labor displayed exceptional inertia following the 2014-2016
recession. While economic growth resumed in the first quarter of 2017, unemployment remained
38
high long after the recession was over and the highest unemployment rate was registered in the
first quarter of 2018. Since then, the small improvement in the labor level has been driven by the
informal sector.
One of the features that sets the 2014-2016 recession apart from the other two episodes is
the long period of economic expansion that preceded the downturn. Figure A.15, which displays
quarterly output growth and a formal labor index that accounts for population growth and seasonal
patterns, shows that labor expanded as the economy grew between 2003-2008 and 2010-2014 but
remained flat since GDP started to improve in 2017.
We argue that the Brazil’s labor severance policy had a decisive role in the observed labor
dynamics in particular because of the accumulative nature of the termination penalty. Before we
discuss the mechanisms through which the severance penalty generates this state-dependence in
the labor adjustment, we describe the characteristics of Brazil’s labor regulatory framework that
are important in our context.
2.3 Labor adjustment costs in Brazil: legal background and economic implications
In 1943, Brazil’s government laid the foundation to its labor protection regulatory framework
with the CLT, Consolidation of Labor Laws in free translation, that established guidelines for paid
leave, overtime compensation, and weekly hours.2 Unlike the Fair Labor Standards Act, which
institutes minimum requirements for labor relations in the U.S. but gives considerable autonomy
to companies and workers to decide on specific conditions, the CLT rendered employer-employee
contracts non-legally binding. In this sense, when a firm hires a worker in Brazil, it automatically
agrees to CLT-imposed terms.
In 1967, the government implemented the Warranty Fund for time of Service, FGTS, as an
economic instrument of labor protection. Each worker in Brazil has an “FGTS account” that con-
sists of a savings account in a financial institution owned and operated by the federal government.
Employers are required to contribute an additional 8% of a month’s pay to their workers’ FGTS
accounts. Despite comprising a sizable share of private savings as Figure A.19 shows, the FGTS
2A workweek consists of a maximum of 44 hours. Additional hours must be compensated as overtime.
39
account is not a typical savings account, since workers cannot invest directly and may only with-
draw funds under special circumstances; such as severe illness, primary real estate purchases (indi-
viduals who already own a home are not eligible), death (funds are transferred to legal dependents),
and unjustified termination.
In the event of unjustified termination, the employer must pay an additional penalty that amounts
to 50% of the worker’s balance relative to the employment contract. For instance, if a worker quits
her current job to join a second company and is later terminated then the FGTS penalty is based
on the second employment contract only - though she may withdraw the funds invested during her
previous employment.
The FGTS penalty is not imposed under justified terminations but the conditions for justified
termination do not take the economic environment into account. For instance, if a company files
bankruptcy, severance compensation has priority claim when assets are liquidated. Workers may
be fired with justification only if they engage in dishonest practices, perform their labor activities
while intoxicated, disclosed classified information, or prolonged absence from work. The burden
of proof lies with the firm, who is also responsible for litigation costs regardless of the outcome.
Typically, firms only pursue a justified termination when there is overwhelming evidence of worker
misconduct.
Several countries, particularly in Western Europe, adopt severance pay to protect workers and
discourage turnover. Since workers are entitled to withdraw the funds in case of unjustified ter-
mination, one could think of the monthly FGTS deposits as a government-imposed pay-as-you-go
severance compensation system. However, unlike, say, Portugal and Spain, where severance pay
is capped above a certain threshold, the FGTS balance grows as long as the worker remains em-
ployed with the firm and, more importantly for our purposes, the FGTS penalty works as a de
facto firing cost that depends on wage and worker tenure. We will refer to the relation between
past wages/tenure and the magnitude of the FGTS penalty as the “state dependence” feature of the
FGTS firing cost.
State-dependent firing costs affect the dynamics of labor allocation in different ways compared
to the typical labor adjustment costs. More specifically, in the case of Brazil, a workforce reduction
40
of the same magnitude could be considerably more costly after a long economic expansion than
after a recession (see Section 2.4).3 In this case, forward-looking firms face a trade-off between
current-period earnings and expected future losses from FGTS penalty when they make labor de-
cisions. Therefore, the price of labor reflects the (marginal) contribution of labor to production and
the forward-looking component related to the risk of future firing costs.
A by-product of the strict labor laws in Brazil is the consolidation of a large informal sector
that attracts workers who cannot find formal-sector jobs and, more recently, of workers who choose
not to work in the formal sector because of the lack of flexibility the regulatory burden imposes.
Workers in the informal sector do not receive severance pay and the greater flexibility is evident in
the dynamics of informal-sector employment.
We propose a theoretical model with the underlying fundamentals of the Brazilian labor market:
formal-sector firms are subject to severance pay and firing cost as implied by the FGTS. Informal-
sector firms can adjust labor without frictions. Details of the model are spelt out in Section 2.4.
2.4 The model
Our model economy consists of a representative agent that supplies labor elastically to formal-
and informal-sector representative firms. Both firms are risk neutral and choose labor and capital
to maximize profit. The formal-sector firm must pay severance compensation in case of work-
force downsizing whereas no labor adjustment cost is imposed on the informal-sector firm. The
household owns the capital stock and rents it to the firms in every period.
To describe the model explicitly, let us denote formal and informal-sector variables by sub-
scripts ‘F’ and ‘N’ respectively. That is, denote formal-sector labor and capital at time t by LFt
and KFt. Similarly, informal-sector labor and capital are denoted by LNt and KNt. We assume the
share of capital in production, α, to be constant across sectors. Assume the production technology
3Typical adjustment costs only depend on the size of the labor adjustment but not on the state or length of previous
state of the economy. See Sargent (1978), Cooper and Willis (2009), and Cooper et al. (2015) for standard adjustment
costs. See Caballero and Engel (1993) for a seminal work in state-dependent adjustment costs.
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1−α, i = F,N.
where Yit denotes sector i’s output, At is the aggregate total factor productivity, and Ait denotes
sector-specific labor productivity. Both firms produce the same good.
Optimal capital and labor levels for the informal-sector firm follow the simple marginal con-
ditions and are such that their marginal products match the rent rNt and wage wNt rates. The
decision of the formal-sector firm however is a bit more involved. Labor and capital levels are
chosen to maximize profit in every period but if the choice of labor level LFt is lower than that
of the previous period, i.e., if LFt < LF,t−1, then the firm must pay a penalty whose magnitude
depends on the current FGTS balance and the size of the workforce decline. Since our model
is built upon a representative-agent framework, we abstract from quits and assume that all labor
reductions are due to employee terminations. Let Gt denote the fraction of FGTS holdings paid
when formal-sector labor declines from LF,t−1 to LFt. We model the firing cost imposed by the








if LFt < LF,t−1
0 if LFt ≥ LF,t−1,
where parameter θ captures the magnitude of the adjustment cost. If θ > 1, then a 1% decline in
formal-sector labor implies a penalty of more than 1% of current FGTS holdings.
When a formal-sector worker loses her job, she may withdraw the entirety of her FGTS balance
but the firm is also required to pay a separate fraction ζ1 of her FGTS holdings.4 The legislation
4Suppose, for illustrative purposes, that an employee accumulated $100 in her FGTS account and her current
employment is terminated. She may withdraw the entire balance if she so chooses but her employer is required to pay
her $100 ζ1 regardless of her decision. If she chooses to not withdraw her FGTS funds, her balance remains at $100
as the FGTS penalty is paid directly to the terminated employee instead of invested in her FGTS account.
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that establishes that the FGTS penalty must amount to 50% of the terminated worker’s FGTS bal-
ance was enacted in 2002 - from 40% in prior years. To ensure our model is flexible enough to
accommodate these policy changes, let ζ0 denote the fraction of monthly pay invested in every
period and ζ1 is the fraction of FGTS holdings that must be paid in the event of unjustified termi-
nation. Throughout the paper, ζ0 and ζ1 will be set to 0.08 and 0.5 to reflect the legal requirements
active during our data sample. We denote time-t FGTS holdings by Ht and, therefore, the firing
cost expenditure can be written by ζ1GtHt.
Since a fraction ζ0 of a month’s pay is invested every period, aggregate FGTS holdings Ht
evolve over time according to
Ht+1 = ρH Ht + ζ0wFt LFt −GtHt. (2.1)
Aggregate FGTS holdings grow at the same rate as the formal-sector wage bill wFt LFt but scaled
by ζ0. If the labor force shrinks in period t, then overall FGTS holdings decrease by GtHt. The
productivity processes are estimated at the business cycle, i.e., we consider fluctuations around the
underlying trend. We also abstract from population growth. Parameter ρH determines the rate of
mean reversion and the unconditional mean (and variance) of the {Ht}t process. We calibrate ρH
such that the steady-state FGTS holdings as a share of GDP matches that of the data. Aggregate
FGTS holdings typically fluctuate around 7% of annual GDP (see Figure A.19), hence we choose
ρH so that aggregate FGTS holdings is 7% of annual output in steady state.
At this point, we can characterize the formal-sector firm’s maximization problem. Given labor
in the previous period LF,t−1 and the FGTS holdings Ht, the firm chooses capital and labor in the
current period to maximize profit net of firing cost expenditures. The firm’s value Vt is given by
Vt = max
{
At F (KFt, LFt) − (1 + ζ0)wFt LFt − rFtKFt − ζ1GtHt + β Et (Vt+1)
}






Ht+1 = ρH Ht + ζ0wFt LFt −GtHt.
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whereF (KFt, LFt) = KαFt (AFt LFt)
1−α. To keep notation clean, Vt is short-hand for V (Ht, LF,t−1).
Choice variables are LFt, KFt, Gt, Ht+1. Step function It = 1 if LFt < LF,t−1 and zero otherwise.
2.4.1 Workings of the model
While the termination penalty certainly hurts the firm’s profits in the current period, the reduc-
tion in FGTS holdings driven by term −GtHt decreases the firm’s future FGTS liability. In this
sense, if a low productivity draw is expected to linger for a long period, it may be in the firm’s best
interest to pay the firing cost in the current period to avoid carrying a suboptimally high employ-
ment level for a long period. To illustrate the rich dynamics implied by the state-dependent firing
cost, suppose Ht is very high after a long expansion. If a low productivity draw is realized, the
firm may either readjust the employment level and pay the high firing cost or wait out the FGTS
holdings. That is, wait for employees to quit/retire until the employment level matches the new
(low) productivity level and, in the process, slowly decrease the FGTS holdings level (at rate ρH).
The persistence of the productivity process relative to ρH is at the core of the firm’s decision: the
more persistent the productivity process the higher the present value of the cost of waiting on the
FGTS balance to decline by itself.
To make the tradeoff between current-period production and future FGTS liability clearer, let us
characterize the formal-sector firm’s demand for labor. First, let λHt denote the Lagrange multiplier
for the law of motion in Eq. 2.2. From the first-order necessary conditions, we have that
λHt = βEt
[
ζ1Gt+1 + (ρH −Gt+1)λHt+1
]
. (2.3)
Given LFt, if next-period’s optimal labor level is likely to be lower than today’s and, in this
case, incurring in the termination penalty, then the termEt[ζ1Gt+1] can be thought of as the FGTS-
implied expected loss. Term (ρH −Gt+1)λHt+1 indicates that λHt+1 decays at a rate faster than ρH if
a workforce decline occurs the next period.
Note that if formal-sector labor is far above steady state in the current period, then only ex-
ceptionally high productivity draws will push labor further up. That is equivalent to saying that a
termination penalty is likely to occur next period and that termination-penalty-risk is high for high
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labor levels. This is perhaps the most important unintended consequence of the FGTS penalty,
that the incentive to increase labor in an expansion declines as the labor level itself increases. In
the context of our model, one should expect that labor will respond less sharply to a sequence of
positive productivity shocks under the FGTS-penalty policy than in a more flexible environment.
If the FGTS holdings are high enough, further productivity gains would have negligible effects
on the labor level as the expected penalty completely offsets the production benefits of additional
labor. This feature sets our model apart from the standard labor adjustment costs in the literature.
2.4.2 Labor dynamics
The key mechanism is that the price of labor reflects the contribution to production, as in
standard RBC models, but also the termination-penalty-risk. From the formal-sector firm’s optimal























Ht+1 (ζ1 − λHt+1)
]}
,
where, again, It indicates LFt < LF,t−1. Aside from λHt , the term in brackets on the left-hand
side arises from the mandatory FGTS contributions made by the employer in every period. Note
that ζ0 > 0 shifts the demand for labor in the formal sector because marginal product of labor






and the curvature in the production function implies that
firms will choose lower labor than in the case of ζ0 = 0. While ζ0 > 0 affects the stationary labor
level, λHt and the term in brackets on the right-hand side affect the dynamics of the labor choice -
though they are zero in (deterministic) steady state. Shadow-price of labor λHt represents the effect
of next-period’s FGTS holdings on the firm’s current value and could be interpreted as the indirect
cost of an additional unit of labor. From Eq. 2.3, λHt is purely forward-looking and embodies the
riskiness in workforce expansions caused by the increased likelihood of termination penalties in
the future.
Away from the steady state, the term in brackets on the right-hand side of Eq. 3.1 introduces a
wedge between the formal-sector wage and the marginal product of labor. To understand the effect
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of the wedge on the labor level, first note that while It may be zero, Et [It+1] = Prob(LF,t+1 >
LFt |LFt) is greater than zero, though small when LFt is low. Suppose a positive productivity
shock is realized in period t. The firm has incentive to raise the labor level to match the new
marginal product of labor. However, the probability Prob(LF,t+1 > LFt |LFt) also rises as LFt
increases and term β Et
[




partially offsets the marginal product gains.
Since the firm’s only instrument to adjust marginal product of labor is the labor level itself, the
increase in LFt caused by the productivity gain is smaller than it would have been in the absence of
termination penalty. In practice, firms adjust labor more cautiously when they face the possibility
of an adjustment penalty in the future.
The moderate response of labor in the presence of adjustment costs is well-documented in the
literature. Cooper and Willis (2009), for instance, describe how different forms of adjustment cost
affect the shape and magnitude of the labor response. The novelty of our approach is the state-
dependent magnitude of the firing cost. To be more specific, given the probability of a workforce
downsizing in the next period, the firm’s incentives under low Ht are radically different than those
under high Ht. This feature of our model is of paramount importance in replicating the behavior
of formal-sector labor after economic recessions in Brazil. The recession in 2002 followed a long
period of economic turmoil after the currency crisis of 1998. Employment and wages were on
a downward spiral that led FGTS deposits to historically low levels in 2002 (see Figure A.18).
When the confidence crisis receded and the economy started to recover in 2003, formal-sector
labor recovered quite promptly, which reinforced the output recovery and by the end of 2003 the
economy was on steady growth path that would last until late 2008 (see Figures A.16 and A.17).
The recession that started roughly in the third quarter of 2014, on the other hand, followed a
period of strong and steady economic growth. FGTS holdings were at unprecedented high levels
as deposits hit an all-time-high in early 2015. Despite massive layoffs in 2015 and 2016 and
inevitable corrections in the FGTS growth path, formal-sector labor is still reluctant to pick up.
While it may be inaccurate to describe the post-2017 recovery as jobless, the main driver seems to
be the informal sector. Section 2.6 discusses in detail how our model sheds light in the dynamics
of labor under recessions and subsequent recoveries.
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2.4.3 The household’s problem
A representative agent chooses a sequence of consumption, investment, and labor to maximize
lifetime utility. We assume period utility













where γ is the risk-aversion parameter, φ determines the elasticity of labor supply, and ηF and ηN
determine the marginal disutility of labor with potentially ηF 6= ηN .
The assumption that elasticity of labor supply across sectors stems from our representative
agent framework. More specifically, fluctuations in the formal and informal labor levels LFt and
LNt capture cross-sector labor flows indirectly and elasticity of labor supply, being a preference
parameter, should not change as the same worker transitions across sectors.
In reality, workers that lose their formal-sector jobs may work in an informal job during her
search for a position in the formal sector or even work in the informal sector permanently as a
“juridic person.” That is, at the aggregate level there is no characteristic that distinguishes formal-
sector workers from informal workers. Our approach differs from that of Albanesi (2017), in
which aggregate labor supply comprises male and female labor, in the sense that no transition
across gender groups can occur and labor preferences across groups may be heterogeneous.
While the representative household and the two firms are the only decision-making agents in
our model economy, government consumption and trade balance play a sizable role in the dynamics
of Brazil’s economy. To deal with this issue, we follow Smets and Wouters (2007) and model
government spending plus trade balance as an exogenous process which we denote by Xt.
The household spends its disposable income on consumption and physical capital. Let Kit
denote physical capital allocated to sector i in period t, and rit the return on sector i’s capital net
of depreciation. Then the household’s time-t budget constraint in is given by
Ct +KF,t+1 +KN,t+1 = (1− δ + rFt)KFt + (1− δ + rNt)KNt (2.5)
+ wFt LFt + wNt LNt −Xt,
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where household expenditures are displayed on the left-hand side of Eq. 2.5 and disposable income
on the right-hand side. Parameter δ denotes physical capital depreciation.
We assume the household and formal-sector firm discount time at the same rate β and that the
market for capital is perfectly flexible. Optimality conditions for the household’s problem imply





denotes the stochastic discount factor for the representative household then Et [Mt+1 rF,t+1] =
Et [Mt+1 rN,t+1].











In recent years, the flexibility of the informal sector has attracted an increasing number of
younger workers, typically skilled, that are willing to face lower job security in returns for higher
wages. While our approach assumes a representative household and, therefore, abstracts from
individual characteristics that affect wages, the FGTS model has important insights on the trade-
off between job security and wages.
Specifically, we denote the difference between wages and marginal product of labor, MPL, in
the formal sector as the formal-sector wage premium. First note that the FGTS policy induces a
wedge between wage and marginal product of labor even when the economy is in steady state.
Optimality conditions for the formal sector firm imply wF (1 + ζ0) = MPL. In other words, firms
pay the MPL and the mandatory FGTS savings are withdrawn from paychecks so that workers
receive a fraction 1/(1 + ζ0) of their MPL. Quadratic adjustment ignores this feature and makes
wage equals marginal product of labor in steady state.
Recall from Eq. 3.1 that, away from steady state, formal-sector wage is not a trivial fraction
of marginal product of labor. If the economy contracts and firms downsize their workforce, then
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and note that it is basically FGTS holdings per capita
Ht/Lf,t−1 times the marginal cost ζ1 minus marginal benefit λHt of firing one additional worker
















∣∣LF,t+1 < LFt]P (LF,t+1 < LFt) + 0 · P (LF,t+1 ≥ LFt) .
While Ht grows at rate ζ0 = 0.08 times the growth rate of LFt, it decreases at a much faster rate.
From Eq 2.1, FGTS holdings evolve according to Ht+1 = ρH Ht + ζ0wFt LFt − GtHt. That is,
given wFt, a one-percent decrease in LFt reduces Ht+1 by ζ0wFt times 1% plus GtHt = 0.01Ht.
In other words, while reducing labor can be costly for firms in the current period, it significantly
decreases their FGTS liability by lowering expected future termination penalty. Hence, the first
term in the forward-looking expression is typically smaller than Ht
LF,t−1
plus it is multiplied by
LF,t+1
LFt
, which is lesser than one - otherwise It+1 = 0.
Therefore, expression θ Ht
LF,t−1








the economy contracts. In that case, formal-sector workers are paid a wage above their marginal
product.
Conversely, when the economy expands and firms increase their workforce, It = 0 in Eq. 3.1
and workers are paid a wage below their marginal product. We interpret the wedge between wage
and marginal product of labor in expansions as a premium that workers pay to the firms so that the
employers take the workers’ productivity risk. In other words, firms capture a share of MPL in
expansions as compensation for the sub-optimally high wages in recessions.
Workers that choose a formal-sector job trade higher wages in expansions for a less volatile
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wage profile. Naturally, this trade-off is only in order for workers that keep their job in recessions.
Since the termination penalty is proportional to worker tenure, younger workers are more likely to
be laid off in economic contractions, which contributes to the declining interest in formal-sector
jobs by young and educated workers. A recent survey by DATAFOLHA found that 55% of workers
with ages between 25 and 34 prefer “higher wages with no labor benefits and lower taxes” versus
41% who are “willing to pay higher taxes but have a formal job with labor benefits.” Among
workers aged between 45 and 59, both answers were chosen by 47% of the respondents. A detailed
report of the survey results is available here.
The incentives that individual workers face given their schooling, age and tenure are outside
the scope of this paper but pose relevant avenues for future research. To close the model, we
now describe the stochastic processes that drive the dynamics of consumption, labor, and capital
allocation.
2.4.4 Stochastic processes
Four exogenous processes drive the productivity dynamics. Two sector-specific processes, AFt
and ANt, capture idiosyncratic sector-specific labor productivity fluctuations. Two independent
processes {ast}t and {amt }t drive temporary and long-lasting movements in total factor productiv-
ity. Process {amt }t is specified as a first-order autoregressive process whereas all other stochastic
processes are assumed to be serially uncorrelated. All processes are assumed homoscedastic.
While all the shock processes are assumed uncorrelated, the short- and long-memory compo-
nents of aggregate productivity induce correlation across formal and informal sectors’ productivity.
The magnitude of such correlation depends on the variance of shared components relative to total
variance of (shared components plus idiosyncratic).
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System of equations 2.6 summarizes the dynamics processes of our model economy:
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iid∼ N(0, 1) (2.6)












at , AFt = e
aFt , ANt = e
aNt .
Our sample spans the 1996-2017 period and labor data are available on a monthly frequency
whereas macroeconomic data are measured quarterly. In this sense, parsimony in the specification
of stochastic processes is crucial for identification of key model parameters (risk aversion γ and
firing cost θ, for instance) with a relatively small sample. Hence, we choose the most parsimonious
specification that allows enough flexibility to properly fit the data and uncover the underlying
dynamics of the endogenous variables.
2.5 Empirical methodology
In this section, we describe the data and discuss the empirical methods employed in the esti-
mation of the structural parameters. We follow Smets and Wouters (2007) and Schorfheide et al.
(2018) and estimate the structural parameters via Bayesian methods. Data are available since 1996,
which makes the estimation of our model’s entire parameter space infeasible. We therefore cali-
brate parameters whose values are well documented in the literature and estimate those parameters
that are specific to our model and/or are critical to the dynamics of endogenous variables.
To assess our model’s fit vis-à-vis a more widely used form of labor adjustment, we estimate a














LF,t−1 if LFt ≤ LF,t−1.
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We aim to explore the differences in dynamics between our FGTS-based state dependent ad-
justment cost and one commonly used in the literature. Key to our assessment is to evaluate which
model features generate predictions that fit the recent recessions in Brazil more appropriately.
2.5.1 Data
We obtained labor market and macroeconomic data from IBGE, or Brazilian Institute for Ge-
ography and Statistics in free translation. Employment and wage data were obtained from the PME
and PNAD surveys that IBGE has organized and implemented for the past three decades.
The PME, or Monthly Employment Survey, consists of a survey in the six largest metropolitan
areas in Brazil. It covers the period 1980-2015 though changes in the methodology were imple-
mented in 2002. It provides information on the worker’s gender, age, schooling, race, employment,
type of labor contract (formal/informal), sector (public/private), time on the job, wage, and infor-
mation about the worker’s last job (wage, type of labor contract and duration of last job’s contract).
In the data, our definition of “informal” labor comprises all instances of workers that do
not have a formal labor contract (no CLT), including workers that describe themselves as “self-
employed” in the employment surveys. Some of these businesses may be informal from a legal
perspective but most are “juridic persons”: a one-person firm that supply labor services to another
firm. These one-person firms pay corporate taxes like any other firm and, therefore, are not viewed
as informal by the authorities. However, from the employer’s perspective, the nature of the labor
decision in contracting another firm that supplies labor services is different from that of hiring a
worker directly. A firm, even if it is a one-person firm that provides the same service as a proper
worker, is not entitled to severance pay. In this sense, our definition of informal labor stems from
the nature of labor decision in our model framework.
The PNAD, National Household Sample Survey, is a survey conducted nationwide every year
that is not covered by the decennial national census. However, starting in 2012, IBGE implemented
the PNAD Contı́nua, or Continuous PNAD, which occurs on a quarterly basis and replaced the
PME. The variables available in the Continuous PNAD microdata are identical to the PME but
the target population is not: unlike the PME, the Continuous PNAD covers the whole national
territory. Microdata for both surveys (and the national Census) are available on IBGE’s website.
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To circumvent the change in methodology in 2002 and the extinction of PME in 2015, we splice
the data backwards from 2002 to 1996 and forward from 2015 to 2017. The procedure consists
of applying the growth rates observed in these periods to extend the main sample, in this case,
the 2002-2015 PME. More specifically, we construct the sample prior to 2002 so that growth rates
match those of the old PME (1980-2002) but the endpoint of the imputed data series coincides
with the observed values in December 2002 in the new PME (2002-2015). The same process was
applied to the PNAD but in the opposite direction, i.e., the starting point of the imputed time series
matches the endpoint of the new PME, December 2015.
Output, consumption, and investment data are also obtained from IBGE’s website. Time series
for the national accounts start in 1996 and are measured quarterly.
The theoretical model is built upon real variables only and, to that end, we adjust all variables
for inflation. Since both the informal and formal sector firms produce the same consumption good
whose price determines the purchase power of wages, we use the IGP-DI price index, which is
computed by the Getulio Vargas Foundation, for inflation adjustment. The IGP-DI, or General
Price Index - Internal Availability, measures the price level of goods and services produced do-
mestically, that is, by firms that make capital and labor decisions under Brazil’s regulatory and
economic environment.5
We apply Hamilton’s simple filter Hamilton (2017) to remove trends and seasonal patterns,
and compute deviations from steady state. This allows us to match the observable variables to their
theoretical counterparts. In practice, pre-filtering the data into deviations-from-steady-state series
allows us to tie variables in the model to the data via observation equations. Figures A.16 and
A.17 show the filtered series used for labor and wages; and output, consumption and investment,
respectively. Shaded areas indicate recessions.
2.5.2 Parameter estimation
Economic data in emerging countries are typically less readily available than in industrialized
economies. In the case of Brazil, the political system underwent such radical transformations in the
5An economy-wide price index that takes the price of foreign-made goods into account would inevitably embody
undesirable exchange-rate noise in our data series, especially at the monthly frequency.
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late 1980’s (redemocratization) that the institutional framework in the early 1990’s was remarkably
different from that of the post-1996 period. In this sense, while data are not available for the period
prior to 1995, it is unlikely that an economic model designed for the 1996-2018 period would
appropriately fit previous years.
With the balance between parsimony and flexibility being ever more tenuous in this context, we
calibrate parameters that are either established in the literature or have minor implications to the
dynamics of the proposed model. Table A.4 displays our benchmark calibration. Capital share α,
depreciation δ, and subjective discount factor β are set to standard values in the literature. However,
there is no consensus for the elasticity of labor supply and empirical results in the literature range
from 0.15 to 1.2 (Keane and Rogerson 2012), with values in the inelastic range being the norm.
Unfortunately, the likelihood surface is quite flat in the range of reasonable values of the elasticity
of labor supply and, therefore, we choose to estimate the model conditional on calibrated values for
φ. We then investigate the sensitivity of parameter estimates to the calibration of labor elasticity.
After several preliminary runs, we found labor disutility from the formal-sector labor to be
statistically indistinguishable from that of the informal sector. Since the ratio
ηF
ηN
is key for steady-
state capital, and consequently, other endogenous variables, calibrating labor disutility saves sig-
nificant computational effort and improves identification of critical parameters in the estimation
step.
We estimate the volatility of aggregate productivity processes but calibrate the volatility of
sector-specific labor productivity shocks. Note that aggregate and sector-specific volatilities cannot
be identified if estimated jointly, hence our choice to calibrate σF and σN . The value 2% per annum
fits the data well - the majority of filtered shocks lie in the [−2, 2] interval.
Our sample comprises mixed-frequency data, monthly and quarterly, which we accommodate
via Kalman filtering of within-quarter unobserved values. Output, consumption, investment, and
government consumption plus foreign trade balance are observed on a quarterly basis and, there-
fore, are filtered to match the monthly frequency of labor data (labor levels and wages).
Schorfheide et al. (2018) stresses the importance of accounting for measurement errors when
dealing with data at the monthly frequency. The measurement error issue is particularly relevant
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in the context of Latin America as price-level fluctuations6 can be an order of magnitude greater
than that of fundamental shocks. If measurement errors caused by inflation noise in the data
are neglected, then estimates of productivity processes will be inaccurate. For these reasons, all
inflation-adjusted variables observed at the monthly frequency are assumed to be measured with
error in the observation equations.
Parameters {γ, θ, υ+, υ−, ρ, σm, σs, µF} are estimated via MCMC. We draw 200,000 samples
from four independent chains with different starting values and discard the 50% initial draws to
ensure convergence. Priors for all parameters - except υ+ and υ−, naturally - are the same under
both FGTS and quadratic adjustment specifications. Priors are relatively vague, in particular the
priors for the firing cost parameters θ, υ+ and υ−. See Table A.5 for a detailed description of the
prior distributions and posterior results.
Risk aversion under both FGTS and quadratic adjustment costs is estimated at 1.23 and 1.64,
respectively. Since our estimation procedure is based on real macroeconomic variables such as
consumption, output, investment, it is not surprising that risk aversion is relatively low given no
asset price data are present in the sample. Our results are comparable to those of Glomm, Jung,
and Tran (2009).
Estimates for the parameters that drive the productivity processes are relatively consistent
across models, with estimated persistence around 0.97 and volatility of short-memory produc-
tivity around 0.04 under both specifications. The volatility of long-memory productivity varies
only slightly between the FGTS and quadratic adjustment models with estimated values at 0.032
and 0.017 respectively.
Our estimates for the quadratic adjustment cost parameters υ+ and υ− are 3.89 and 3.97, re-
spectively. To put these values in perspective, Cooper and Willis (2009) found 3.95 and −0.14
using U.S. data. In this sense, the cost incurred in upward adjustments of the workforce is re-
markably similar in the U.S. and Brazil. However, the cost of adjusting the workforce downwards
6In 11/2002, monthly inflation measured by the IGP-DI was 5.84%, almost 11 times as large as the calibrated value
for the sector labor productivity vol σF and σN .
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is radically different in these two countries. Parameter υ− estimated for Brazil is large and sig-
nificantly greater than zero - point estimate at 3.97 and 90% credible bounds [0.96, 7] - whereas
Cooper and Willis (2009) estimated υ− at −0.14, with standard error 1.3, for the U.S..
Firing cost θ is the critical parameter in the context of the FGTS model and we estimate it at
1.38 with 90% credible bounds [1.10, 1.66]. The estimated value for θ implies that a 1% reduction
in the formal-sector workforce incurs a penalty that amounts to 1.4% of aggregate FGTS holdings,
on average. Figure A.20 depicts the density plots of prior and posterior distributions of adjustment
cost parameters.
Note that while the quadratic adjustment model imposes a “transaction cost” that is propor-
tional to the level of labor itself, the FGTS-implied adjustment cost is proportional to FGTS hold-
ings regardless of the labor level. This fundamental difference allows the FGTS specification to
capture labor market inertia, in the sense of employers’ reluctance to adjust labor, even at low
labor levels, a feature that is critical to understand the dynamics of Brazil’s labor market that the
quadratic adjustment model cannot replicate. Section 2.6 discusses the adequacy of FGTS and
quadratic specifications in replicating recent economic events in Brazil in greater level of detail.
2.6 Discussion
This section discusses the mechanisms through which our model economy replicate the dy-
namics of Brazil’s economy in the 2000-2018 period. In a nutshell, we simulate paths of structural
shocks that resemble the history of states leading up to the 2003 and 2009 recoveries and 2014-
2016 recession and discuss the model implications for macroeconomic variables. We then compare
the implications of our FGTS-inspired model to labor and wages vis-à-vis those of a quadratic ad-
justment cost model. To give an overview of the model-implied dynamics, we begin our exposition
by describing the response of macro variables to a technology shock when the economy is at steady
state.
Starting from steady state at t = 0, a 1 s.d. shock to long-memory productivity εmt arrives at
t = 1. Figures A.22 shows the responses of consumption, investment, savings rate and capital
allocation under a standard RBC economy with no frictions and under our model economy at the
point estimates from Table A.5. The direction of the investment response in our model economy
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is similar to that of a standard RBC economy but the magnitude is significantly smaller in the four
months after the productivity shock is realized. While the response of investment under both sce-
narios is indistinguishable after five periods, the long-term effects on the capital stock is noticeable
(see top panel of Figure A.22).
In addition to the effects of the termination penalty on aggregate capital stock, there are also
implications to the allocation of capital across sectors. In a standard economy, the path of capital
allocated to each sector in the aftermath of a productivity rise is virtually identical since TFP for
both sectors is driven by an economy-wide stochastic process. However, when the firing penalty
is in place, the formal sector sees a decline in capital stock on impact whereas the informal sector
experiences an inflow of capital that outpaces that of an standard RBC economy. The disinvestment
in the formal sector is caused by the cautious increase in the formal-sector labor level that the
termination penalty induces. More specifically, capital is allocated across sectors so that the ex-
ante marginal product of capital is equalized. Since marginal product of capital depends on the
next-period labor level, which is expected to increase only moderately in the formal sector (see
Figure A.23), then the higher expected return on informal-sector capital commands a higher capital
level to equalize the expected returns across sectors. Nevertheless, the production function in both
sectors display decreasing marginal products and the shift of physical capital towards the informal
sector is not enough to completely offset the effects of the termination penalty friction and the
response of aggregate capital stock is lower than that of a standard economy for every period after
a rise in aggregate productivity.
The response of capital stock to productivity shocks is crucial for long-term growth and Figure
A.22 displays how a higher consumption profile would be attained in the absence of the termination
penalty. The higher capital stock in a standard economy that sustains the higher consumption path
is supported by the higher savings rate, lower consumption-output ratio, in the aftermath of the
productivity rise.
Figure A.23 depicts the responses of labor and wages to the 1 s.d. shock to long-memory pro-
ductivity εmt . Not surprisingly, labor rises in both sectors but the increase in the formal-sector labor
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is partially dampened under the FGTS policy. Interestingly, wage rises more sharply in the stan-
dard RBC economy, which should, in principle, counteract labor demand. Instead, both labor and
wages rise more intensely in the standard economy as productivity increases. The key to under-
standing the muted response of labor under the FGTS policy is the indirect price of labor, shown
in the bottom-left panel of Figure A.23. As labor increases, FGTS holdings also increase, raising
the termination-penalty risk. The increased riskiness of labor incentivizes the firm to expand its
workforce more cautiously.
The gap between the responses of formal labor under the FGTS and standard economies van-
ishes at about eight months. However, it is not accurate to dismiss the severance policy as irrelevant
in the long run. When productivity rises, a greater share of the new labor income is saved in the
standard RBC economy. Since savings are completely invested in physical capital, the short-lived
gap in the responses of labor and wages allows for a higher consumption path that lasts several
years in the standard RBC economy.
Since the main feature of the FGTS specification is that the magnitude of the termination
penalty depends on the history of prior labor and wages - unlike the quadratic adjustment model
which takes only previous period’s labor level into account - we are mostly interested in the impli-
cations of the FGTS penalty away from steady state, in particular after recessions and expansions.
In the period covered by our sample, 1998-2017, Brazil’s economy experienced three reces-
sions that differed in causes, length and intensity. And so did the labor market dynamics in each of
the recessions. In the remainder of this section we discuss how the FGTS-inspired adjustment cost
can account for the observed dynamics more accurately in a parsimonious framework.
2.6.1 The economy before 2003
The Asian and Russian crises of 1997 and 1998 had significant repercussions to the emerging
world as the foreign investors’ confidence decline triggered currency depreciations and sharp in-
creases in Latin-American country-risk premia. The turmoil in emerging economies, coupled with
fears of the return of uncontrolled inflation forced Brazil’s monetary authority to keep interest rates
consistently above 20% throughout 1997-1999, with rates being as high as 42% during the peak of
the Asian Financial crisis in Nov/1997.
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Despite the turbulence in the emerging world in the 1990s, Brazil’s economy managed to keep
a positive, albeit mediocre, growth rate. However, in 2002, Argentina defaulted on its sovereign
debt after a long and harsh recession. In addition, the possibility that a far-left candidate, Mr.
Lula da Silva, could win Brazil’s presidential elections sparked a confidence crisis that plunged
investment and job creation. Inflation, which at that point seemed a problem of the past, loomed
at uncomfortably high levels - 5% in July 2002 alone - and fueled the fear that Mr. Lula da Silva,
if elected, would curb the central bank’s inflation targeting mandate, effectively choosing a soft
default via inflation instead of Argentina’s hard default.
Country-risk premium during the 2002 confidence crisis reached remarkable 2, 400 basis points,
all but precluding the government’s ability to finance its debt, which led to an emergency loan with
the IMF. As the election of Mr. Lula da Silva grew increasingly likely, he issued a public statement,
the now famous “Letter to the Brazilian people,” in which he committed his economic policy to
the continuity of previous years’ macroeconomic tripod: fiscal primary surplus, floating exchange
rates and inflation targeting.
The candidate’s strong signal that his government would not disrupt economic policies that
helped stabilize the country post-hyperinflation reassured investors and, by the second quarter of
2003, the economy was on a path of strong growth that would be briefly interrupted by the 2008
Financial crisis.
Figures A.16 and A.17 depict labor and wage, and output, investment and consumption through-
out 2000-2017. The leftmost shaded area indicates the 2002 recession. The small decline in output
despite sharp drops in consumption and investment is due to a significant improvement in the trade
balance, which rose from −2.2% in 2001 to 2.2% in 2003, as share of GDP. Trade balance in 2002
was 0.8% of GDP.
Real wage declined in both sectors (Figure A.16) though more abruptly in the informal sector.
Formal-sector labor declined quickly whereas informal labor was low and remained low during the
recession. As economic conditions improved, low wages in the informal sector contributed to the
vertiginous rise in informal labor during the recovery that started in 2003. Formal-sector labor also
improved in the aftermath of the recession though at a more moderate rate.
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In the context of our model economy, we interpret the 2002 recession as a sequence of negative
shocks to the short-memory productivity process after a long period of negative but small long-
memory TFP shocks. Since the confidence crisis was fueled by international conditions rather than
issues in the fundamentals of the domestic economy and the recovery started despite the absence
of structural reforms, it is reasonable to think of the crisis as negative shocks to the short-memory
process. The long sequence of small negative shocks to the long-memory TFP process refers to
the high unemployment, high interest rates and low investment that characterized the 1998-2001
period.
On the other hand, the recovery from the 2002 recession prompted a rise in labor and wages
that lasted several years, indicating that the recovery was most likely triggered by a rise in long-
memory productivity. To investigate the dynamics of labor, wages, and other macroeconomic
variables as the economy recovers, we compute simulated paths for the macro variables under
the FGTS and quadratic adjustment models, and, for reference, under a standard RBC which we
will use as a benchmark “frictionless” economy. The sequence of shocks follow a 36-month-long
decline in long-memory productivity: we generate a sequence starting at εmt−36 = 0 to ε
m
t = −1.5






To compute the theoretical response of a long-memory TFP shock after the sequence of shocks
described, we simulate two paths of each macro variable: one with a 1-s.d. shock at t+1, εmt+1 = 1,
and zeros afterwards, εmt+j+1 = 0 ∀j > 0; and another with zeros after the recession, εmt+j =
0 ∀j > 0. To make our exposition clear, we refer to the former and latter as the impulse and
counterfactual series respectively. We denote the impulse-response of a variable as the percent
difference between its implied value under the impulse and counterfactual series. For reference,
standard impulse-responses, typically interpreted in terms of deviations from steady states, assume
a counterfactual series in which no shock hits the system, hence all variables in steady state. For
the simulated paths, we set parameters to their posterior means from Table A.5.
Figure A.24 depicts the responses of labor, wages, investment, consumption and output. Com-
pared to the frictionless model, both FTGS and quadratic adjustment models dampen the response
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of formal-sector labor but the quadratic model imposes a much smoother rise in the labor level than
the FGTS. Note that the economy is coming out of a recession and labor level is depressed by the
previous sequence of negative productivity shocks. Since the cost of adjusting labor is proportional
to last period’s labor level, the decline in labor decreases the adjustment cost under the quadratic
model. The stifling effects of the quadratic specification are strong enough that despite the advan-
tage of a temporary low labor level, the response under the quadratic model is still significantly
muted relative to that of the FGTS.
The decline in labor during the recession also decreases the adjustment cost under the FGTS
policy. However, unlike the quadratic adjustment cost, in which the cost of increasing or decreasing
the labor force by 1% has a one-to-one relation with the labor level itself, a one-percent increase
in the labor level raises FGTS holdings by ζ0 = 0.08%, all else constant. This feature explains the
discrepancies in the decay rate across models after formal-sector labor peaks, about five months
after the impulse. Quadratic adjustment implies labor barely changes between five and twelve
months after the impulse whereas the decay rate implied by the FGTS model is roughly the same
as the standard RBC model. Because only a fraction of the labor increase was passed on to the
FGTS holdings, the cost of reducing labor is much lower than that implied by the quadratic model
hence the more flexible response of labor under the FGTS model.
The FGTS and quadratic models also have considerably different implications for the informal
sector. The responses of informal-sector labor and wages under the FGTS model are identical to
those of a standard RBC. Interestingly, quadratic adjustment on formal labor significantly stifles
the responses of informal labor and wage. To understand why this happens, first note no-arbitrage
in the physical capital market implies equal ex-ante returns to capital across sectors. Because
adjusting formal labor is costly, agents expect the increase in formal labor to be small when TFP
rises. If agents expect a lower labor-capital ratio7 in the formal sector, they allocate physical
capital away from that sector and towards the informal sector. This reallocation of capital towards
the informal sector is depicted in the third panel from the top in Figure A.24.
7Related to the marginal product of capital.
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Since the quadratic model implies small-magnitude fluctuations in labor relative to the FGTS
model, the magnitude of movements in investment will also be smaller under the quadratic model.
But both models predict a reallocation of capital towards the informal sector.
While the response of informal labor under the quadratic adjustment model does show a spike
on impact with faster decay than in the formal sector, the stifled responses of labor and wages seem
to contradict the strong recovery that started in 2003. In the data, informal-sector labor and wages
rose sharply in 2003 whereas formal labor delayed a few months to pick up and formal-sector
wages recovered more moderately than their informal sector counterparts.
Naturally, the observed labor and wage series are the result of a combination of shocks that
preclude the direct interpretation of realized series in terms of theoretical impulse responses. Nev-
ertheless, an adjustment cost specification that imposes strong constraints on the responses of
informal-sector labor and wages such as the quadratic model seems unwarranted, in particular
because the greater flexibility of the informal sector was the motivation for a two-sector model to
begin with. We now discuss the recession that followed the 2008 financial crisis.
2.6.2 The 2008 Financial Crisis
The global financial crisis in 2008 also marked a deterioration of international conditions but a
combination of factors ensured the implications to Brazil’s economy were radically different from
those of 2002.
First, public debt in 2008 was almost entirely denominated in domestic currency, so the in-
evitable currency depreciation did not cause a fiscal crisis. Moreover, the government’s effort to
build reserves in “safe-haven” currencies, raising total reserves from 37,823 U.S. dollars (millions)
in Dec 12, 2002 to 205,761 in Sep 12 2008, allowed the central bank to intervene in the event of
capital flights and contain excessive currency depreciation.
Second, the commodities boom of the 2000s improved Brazil’s terms of trade significantly
and contributed to the strong growth in the period leading up to the financial crisis. Fiscal indica-
tors also improved as tax revenues outgrew government consumption, and inflation seemed to be,
indeed, a problem of the past.
Third, president Lula da Silva had been re-elected in 2006, consolidating one of the longest
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uninterrupted periods of democracy in Brazil’s history, with uneventful free elections, free press
and respect for the checks-and-balances system. The political environment was radically different
from the fear of institutional disruption that was pervasive in 2002.
Fourth, monetary expansions in the U.S. and Euro zone prompted a wave of capital towards
emerging economies in search of higher returns. The availability of capital willing to buy Brazilian
Treasury securities enabled the government to keep interest rates down during the recession. To
highlight the differences between the recessions of 2009 and 2002, government officials expressed
concern about excessive appreciation of the Brazilian Real after 2008 - the “currency wars” debate.
The combination of these factors made the recession that followed the 2008 financial crisis
relatively short, only three quarters of negative GDP growth, and mild, as GDP declined 0.12% in
2009 after a 5.1% expansion in 2008 and returned to its path of strong growth in 2010 with a 7.5%
expansion.
Given that the 2008 financial crisis briefly interrupted a long expansion of Brazil’s economy our
impulse series consist of a five-year-long expansion in which a negative short-memory productivity
shock hits the system after three years from the beginning of the expansion. The counterfactual
series simulates an expansion identical to that of the impulse series with the exception that no
negative productivity shock is realized three years into the expansion.
Figure A.25 depicts the impulse series vis-à-vis the counterfactual series starting one period
before the negative productivity shock is realized. Both FGTS and quadratic adjustment dampen
the response of formal-sector labor though the rate of return to the initial path is slower under
the quadratic adjustment. The response of informal labor under the FGTS specification is indis-
tinguishable from that of a standard RBC whereas the quadratic adjustment specification mildly
hampers the response of informal labor.
While all specifications predict a decline in consumption, the magnitude of the drop is consid-
erably smaller under quadratic adjustment. Since output falls by roughly the same amount across
all models, agents in the quadratic adjustment environment must allocate a larger share of resources
that would be invested in physical capital towards consumption. The third panel from the top in
Figure A.25 confirms that the decline in investment is significantly steeper under the quadratic
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adjustment model.
In a general sense, both quadratic adjustment and FGTS specifications seem to replicate the
dynamics of macroeconomic variables during the recession that followed the 2008 financial crisis:
small movements in formal-sector labor and wage, more pronounced drop in informal labor, and
sizable declines in output, consumption and investment. While annual GDP growth in 2009 was
−0.12%, economic activity measured on a quarterly8 frequency suggests that the recession was
quite severe during the first three quarters of 2009 but a great fourth quarter salvaged what would
have been a disastrous year.
Both models are estimated using the same observation equations and prior distributions. In this
sense, we think of the quadratic adjustment and FGTS specifications as different lenses through
which we look at the same data. Since we focus on models’ ability to explain the dynamics of
the labor, our argument for model adequacy is inevitably centered in the differences between each
model’s implications for labor and wages.
It is important, however, to highlight the fact that both models deliver a more volatile path for
investment than a standard RBC framework and, more importantly, that their predictions for capital
allocation across sectors are remarkably close. Figures A.24 and A.25 suggest that investment
fluctuates more abruptly under models with labor adjustment cost compared to the frictionless
benchmark. Since the representative agent makes investment decisions based on the each sector’s
expected rate of return to capital, both specifications are successful in replicating volatile returns
to capital from relatively well-behaved productivity processes.
Regarding the model-implied allocation of physical capital across sectors, note that both the
rise and drop in productivity in Figures A.24 and A.25 respectively imply an allocation of capital
from the formal sector to the informal sector. Under the standard RBC benchmark, the predicted
response of investment is identical across sectors whereas the introduction of a labor adjustment
cost invariably implies that a larger share of capital is directed to the informal sector.
The recessions of 2002 and 2009 were similar in the sense that foreign events triggered the
8Real GDP growth for 2009Q1-2009Q4: −2.28%, −2.03%, −1.08% and 5.05%.
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decline in economic activity even though the state of Brazil’s economy was quite different entering
each recession. The strong growth of labor and wages in the expansion that preceded the 2009
recession would have a significant impact on the cost of adjusting labor. The FGTS model, which
implies a much more flexible response of formal-sector labor than the quadratic adjustment model
when the economy is in steady state, predicts a response of formal-sector labor that is indistinguish-
able from that of the quadratic adjustment cost. That is, the stifling effect of the FGTS on labor
adjustment can be as large as that of the quadratic specification when FGTS holdings accumulate
for a period long enough. Unlike the previous two recessions, structural factors in the domestic
economy caused the depression of 2014-2016 but this time after a decade-long expansion.
2.6.3 The 2014-2016 depression: the role of state-dependent labor adjustment cost
Unlike the 2008 recession, in which domestic and international factors contributed to miti-
gate the effects of the financial crisis on Brazil’s economy, the recession that started in 2014 was
magnified by unfavorable local and global conditions.
The boom in commodity prices that started around 2003 improved Brazil’s trade balance sig-
nificantly. The 2008 financial crisis did cause a plunge in commodity prices but it was short-lived
and by mid-2009 prices were on the rise again. To put the relevance of commodity prices for
Brazil’s economy in perspective, Brazil is the world’s second largest exporter of iron ore and it
accounted for 16% total exports in 2011, when iron ore prices reached its all-time-high price of
US$ 187 per metric ton. By December 2015, iron ore prices had declined to US$ 41. A similar
pattern is observed in Brazil’s other main exports: crude oil, US$ 125 in March 2012 to US$ 36 in
December 2015 (barrel Brent/Europe); soybean, US$ 615 in 2012Q3 to US$ 323 in 2015Q4 (price
per metric ton); and raw sugar, US$ 0.29 in January 2011 to US$ 0.14 in December 2015 (price
per pound).
The end of the commodities boom caused a sizable trade balance deterioration and the lower
inflow of foreign exchange was determinant in the depreciation of Brazil’s currency, 1.56 Brazilian
Real per U.S. dollar in July 2011 to 4.05 in January 2016. The currency depreciation certainly did
not help, mostly because imported capital goods comprise a significant portion of capital formation
and a few large corporations issued debt in U.S. dollars during the expansion, but since less than
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5% of outstanding public debt is denominated in foreign currency, the fiscal exposure to exchange
rate fluctuations was radically different from that of 2002.
Subsequent trade balance deteriorations depressed economic activity and the fragility of the
government’s fiscal position - obfuscated by strong output growth in previous years - began to
show. Between 2002 and 2015, mandatory government expenditures - Social Security, Payroll,
public health and school systems, unemployment benefits and etc - rose from 11.7% to 15.5%
of GDP. Since most of these expenditures are constitutionally assured, fiscal effort could only be
exerted on discretionary spending, which is mainly public investment.
The unsustainable path of government debt eroded the confidence of consumers and business
owners but the political instability that culminated with the impeachment of president Rousseff
brought investment to a halt. Between 2013 to 2016, investment in fixed capital fell by more than
30% and capital formation declined for astounding fourteen consecutive quarters. Unemployment
rose from roughly 5% in April 2014 to 12% in December 2016 and GDP per capital plunged 9.4%
between 2014 and 2016.
The 2014-2016 depression differs from the previous recessions in that a simple improvement
in external conditions or executive act from the president would not trigger an economic recovery.
Only structural reforms can avert the explosive path of government debt but those require congres-
sional approval that takes time and extensive negotiations. While the new president was able to
pass a debt ceiling law that reassured investors temporarily, his lack of political capital limited his
ability to enact further unpopular but necessary fiscal contractions.
Despite the improvement in economic activity in 2017, net job destruction in the formal sector
was roughly 21, 000, versus 1.53 and 1.32 million jobs destroyed in 2015 and 2016 respectively.
The recovery in the labor market has been driven mainly by the informal sector and another dis-
appointing year for the formal sector consolidated the idea that it will take several years to bring
formal labor to its pre-depression levels.
In the context of our model economy, the 2014-2016 depression resembles a persistent decline
in TFP. More importantly, the productivity drop is realized after a long expansion with strong labor
and wage growth. To assess our model’s predictions for formal labor, we simulate an impulse series
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that consists of a four-year-long expansion that ends with a negative long-memory productivity
shock. The counterfactual series is a simulated path with the same shock realizations as the impulse
series during the expansion period but without a productivity drop at the end of the expansion.
Figure A.26 depicts the impulse series vis-à-vis the counterfactual series.
We plot the model-implied responses to the productivity drop after expansions of varying
lengths to highlight the importance of preceding history to the labor dynamics under the FGTS
specification. Two features of the labor responses shown in Figure A.26 are particularly notewor-
thy.
First, the nature of FGTS holdings accumulation makes labor adjustments after long expansions
considerably more costly than after shorter ones. When productivity drops, firms downsize their
workforce immediately but since the cost of such adjustment is affected by current FGTS balance,
the magnitude of the adjustment is smaller than it would have been in a frictionless environment.
The initial contraction in the size of the labor force reduces the cost of further adjustments, prompt-
ing a new round of labor reduction. This sequence of staggered job destruction delays the trough in
the labor level and the length of the delay depends on the length of the preceding expansion. Figure
A.26 shows that the trough is reached about three months after the productivity drop following a
one-year-long expansion but it takes about a year for labor to hit the bottom after a four-year-long
recession.
The data strongly supports this delayed-trough feature of the FGTS specification: unemploy-
ment rate peaked in the first quarter of 2017, after the recession had presumably ended. The
quadratic adjustment cost fails to replicate this important feature in the data as the length of the
preceding expansion plays no role in the time elapsed until the trough is reached (see right panel
in Figure A.26). Other widely used adjustment cost specifications such as a fixed cost would also
fail to account for the delayed trough because if the productivity decline is large enough to warrant
paying the fixed cost, then firms would make a large adjustment as soon as the productivity shock
is realized.
The second important feature that the FGTS model captures is that the severity of the labor con-
traction also depends on the length of the preceding expansion. Since labor contractions decrease
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firms’ termination penalty risk and estimated persistence of long-memory TFP implies productiv-
ity shocks have a half-life of 22 months, upon the realization of a productivity drop, firms have
an incentive to downsize the workforce in order to decrease their FGTS liability. Note that FGTS
liability is proportional to FGTS holdings, not labor, and that labor reductions are the most effec-
tive instrument to reduce FGTS liability. In this sense, when long expansions end, the correction
of the aggregate FGTS level required is larger relative to that of a shorter expansion. Since firms
implement these corrections via labor contractions, longer expansions will inevitably be followed
by sharp declines in employment.
Additionally, since informal labor adjusts freely, the size and duration of the decline in formal
labor has inevitable implications for the share of aggregate labor comprised by informal workers.
When the negative productivity shock is realized, informal labor drops immediately to match the
new productivity level whereas the decline in formal labor is not as sharp because of the termination
penalty. However, as the economy returns to steady state, informal labor adjusts more quickly,
rising its share in aggregate labor. Figure A.27 depicts the response of informal labor under the
FGTS and quadratic adjustment specifications.
The quadratic adjustment model fails to account for the role of expansion length in the severity
of labor market bust because it assumes that the cost of adjusting labor depends on the previous
labor level only. In fact, under quadratic adjustment, recessions that follow expansions in which
labor rises sharply have a smoother labor decline precisely because labor level is high. The data
suggest that a smooth labor decline after a long expansion such as the 2003-2013 is counterfactual,
as unemployment rose from 5% to 12% within two years. Figure A.16 corroborates the plunge in
formal labor.
2.7 Conclusion
We propose a model in which the cost of adjusting formal-sector labor depends on the history
of equilibrium labor and wages. Our model predicts that the labor decline in recessions that follow
long and strong expansions is more severe than in those that are preceded by short economic
booms. The model also predicts that recessions that follow long expansions typically display
jobless recoveries as the cumulative nature of the FGTS termination penalty implies that the cost
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of adjusting labor is higher after long expansions. The intuition being that once the recession
begins, labor contractions reduce the cost of further adjustments and the labor level gradually
declines towards the trough. Since the adjustment cost rises with the length of the expansion, the
time elapsed between the beginning of the recession and the labor trough increases with the length
of the preceding expansion. This feature is crucial for successfully replicating the labor dynamics
in the 2014-2016 depression, in which unemployment peaked after the recession was over.
In situations in which FGTS holdings are relatively low, e.g., in steady state, after long reces-
sions or even short expansion, our adjustment cost specification allows considerably more flexibil-
ity in labor dynamics than a quadratic adjustment model, enabling our state-dependent specifica-
tion to account for the quick recovery from the 2002 recession. When FGTS holdings are high,
our model can replicate labor inertia as well as a quadratic adjustment (see Figure A.28).
Our model also predicts a capital flow from the formal to the informal sector when the econ-




WORKER REALLOCATION WITH TENURE-DEPENDENT LABOR SEVERING COSTS: A
LIFE-CYCLE PERSPECTIVE
3.1 Introduction
Labor protection laws in Brazil mandate that terminated workers receive severance compensa-
tion proportional to their earnings’ history. This paper investigates a key feature of these protection
laws, the nature of its severance penalty, examining its impact on firms’ labor decisions, wage bar-
gaining and workforce demographics. We focus on the market inefficiencies created when labor
decisions are mainly driven by factors other than relative productivity.
Brazil’s labor market has been the subject of recent studies because of the unique features of
the above-mentioned labor protection laws. For instance, strong labor protection laws coupled
with a bi-modal skilled workforce give rise to sizable discrepancies in earnings between formal
and informal sector (Loureiro, Araujo, and de Souza 2013). This led to a significant portion of
the literature discussing the welfare implications of labor market regulation Bargain and Kwenda
(2014), especially for lower-skilled workers. More recently, Arnold and Bernstein (2018) and
Figueiredo and Francis (2018) focus on the impact of the Brazilian labor protection regulations on
aggregate economic performance and their role in labor dynamics of recent recessions.
In this paper we focus on the individual decision-making of firms when facing this particular
severance penalty. Our contribution to the literature is such that we uncover the mechanisms
through which labor market inefficiencies arise from (dis)incentives at the firm level. Our approach
consists of a theoretical framework in which workers and firms face search frictions in the spirit of
Diamond (1982) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). In our economic environment, the value of
an employee depends on the time remaining in her career and, therefore, we propose an overlapping
generations setting in which workers of different ages compete for the same jobs, along the lines
of Cheron, Hairault, and Langot (2013). In addition, we assume labor productivity is distributed
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uniformly across ages and that, upon meeting a job candidate, firms observe the productivity level
drawn with certainty and then decide whether to proceed operation of the job or extend the search.
Employed workers get new productivity draws with probability 1 − λ and employers subse-
quently decide whether to maintain the relationship with the worker or to break the match.1 If
the firm chooses to separate, then a transfer of magnitude proportional to the worker’s history of
earned wages ensues. In our model breakup of matches are the prerogative of employers, i.e., we
abstract from quits and on-the-job-search.
Our model differs from Arnold and Bernstein (2018), who assume severance penalty of a fixed
magnitude, given we incorporate the history of wages into the size of layoff compensation. In other
words, it may be more costly to terminate a shorter-tenured worker whose wage is sufficiently
higher than that of a longer-tenured lower-waged worker. Our model specification allows for these
subtleties by focusing directly on the history of wages - specifically on FGTS holdings (see Section
3.2) - instead of tenure length.
We find that the model delivers labor and life-cycle dynamics documented for the Brazilian
workforce. In particular, separation rates are found to decline significantly with a rising wage
profile. Secondly, a by-product of the severance policy is that low-productivity workers with long
earnings histories extract sizable rents - as their productivity is not high enough to secure a match
if they were currently unemployed. Finally, an individual’s position in the life-cycle influences
firms’ hiring and firing decisions. That is, we document the age-discriminant hiring practice where
firms require relatively higher productivity levels from older unemployed individuals to proceed
with matches and, on the flip side, the hording effect in which firms find it cost-saving to (out)wait
for older workers to retire instead of bearing the severance costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a detailed description
of the FGTS policy that motivates our model. Section 3.3 describes some stylized facts of Brazil’s
labor market that our model, discussed in Section 3.4, intends to replicate. Model results are
presented in Sections 3.5.
1In this paper we will make a clear distinction between meeting and matching of firms and workers.
71
3.2 Motivation
Labor market regulation in Brazil bars direct negotiations of the terms of severance between
employers and employees. Instead, in the event of termination, firms are required to pay a penalty
that is proportional to the worker’s Warranty Fund for Time of Service - in Portuguese, Fundo de
Garantia por Tempo de Serviço (hereafter, FGTS) - balance. FGTS is a mandatory savings account
assigned to each worker upon entering the formal labor market. During the employee’s tenure, the
firm is legally obligated to invest an additional 8% of a month’s salary in the employee’s FGTS
account at the end of every month.
Even though it is a savings vehicle the FGTS account differs from a regular savings account in
key aspects. For one, all FGTS accounts are managed by the federal government. Workers have no
say as to which financial institution will manage their FGTS savings. Secondly, workers have no
choice as to the assets to which their funds are allocated. Instead, the government exogenously sets
the rate of return to which all accounts are subjected. Thirdly, workers can only withdraw FGTS
funds under special circumstances, such as severe illness, death, purchase of real estate, retirement
and unjustified termination. Exit from the labor market via quitting or justified termination are not
valid conditions for FGTS withdrawals.
Justified termination require the firm to provide evidence of the fired worker’s misconduct,
which include continued absence and dishonest practices, among other reasons. Market conditions
are not legally valid reasons for justified terminations. That is, firms cannot terminate workers
with justification because business is slow. In addition, even if the firm has evidence of a worker’s
misconduct, it will be responsible for all litigation costs and court fees regardless of the final
outcome of the termination process. In practice, therefore, unless the firm has overwhelming
evidence of a worker’s misconduct and the severance penalty is greater than the expected litigation
costs, employers invariably choose to terminate without justification to avoid court costs.
If an employer decides to terminate a worker based on market conditions or for any other
unjustified reason, then there will be a penalty that amounts to 50% of the worker’s FGTS balance
accrued during her tenure with the firm. For instance, if a worker quits her job with firm A after
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thirty years of employment to join firm B but is then terminated after one year, her severance
package consists of 50% of her FGTS savings accumulated only in her last year of the labor force
with firm B.
In sum, if the FGTS balance increases at 8% and the severance penalty consists of 50% of
accrued savings, then the magnitude of the FGTS termination penalty is roughly 4% of wages
accumulated up to the time of termination.2 Comparatively, the personal savings rate in the U.S.
between 2000-2018 is 4.8% (5.5% if we consider the period 1990-2018). Thus, terminating an
employee with thirty years tenure will cost the equivalent of her lifetime savings, if the appropriate
rate of return were the U.S. savings rate of recent decades.
Not surprisingly, the FGTS policy directly impacts worker allocation in Brazil; the nature of
which we investigate in this paper. For instance, we observe that job mobility of long-tenured
workers is remarkably limited in Brazil (see Figure A.29). From the worker’s perspective, quitting
the job she held for a certain period of time is only advantageous if she has an offer whose com-
pensation exceeds the present value of her current earnings plus the expected FGTS compensation;
since the probability of future dismissals is positive. Note that as the expected severance compen-
sation grows with tenure it significantly narrows the set of incentive compatible offers as time on
the job increases.
From the firm’s perspective, it may be so costly to fire a long-tenured employee that, in practice,
it is advantageous to just wait for the worker to retire. Workers are aware that unless they engage
in extremely unprofessional behavior, firms have little incentive to pursue justified termination. In
addition, ceteris paribus, workers also know that the incentives to terminate declines over time.
In this context, if the disutility from labor increases with effort, long-tenured workers have less
incentive to exert high effort levels.
Our theoretical framework rationalizes the labor market features in the data documented in this
section. Importantly we are able to address labor market dynamics that result from decisions based
on (expected) severance costs. In particular, separating from workers will depend not only on labor
2The rate of return chosen by the government rarely exceeds inflation, hence our decision to neglect it.
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productivity but also on accumulated FGTS holdings. That is, cost saving may dictate firms hoard
long-tenured workers at the expense of more productive shorter-tenured workers. Therefore, we
may see instances where firms continue to operate at losses rather than restructure employment,
as firing workers would be more costly. On the other hand, the FGTS could also lead to age-
discriminant hiring with older workers facing higher productivity hurdles. This arises as with
costly search and separation firms may prefer workers which will yield more in present value.
With shorter working lives older workers have to return that much more in productivity to be
profitable.
There are also macroeconomic consequences of the FGTS policy. These can prove detrimental
in economic recessions. For instance, it may be costly for the firm to downsize its workforce to
match market conditions, forcing the firm to retain suboptimally high levels of labor - the labor
hoarding effect. Additionally, since wage reductions are virtually impossible, firms may get stuck
with wage rates negotiated under better economic conditions.3
In summary, FGTS policy will have both micro- and macro-economic impacts on the Brazilian
labor market. The former suggests important but separate age and tenure implications on worker
movements. While the latter can speak to labor hoarding and jobless recoveries during and after
recessions. In this paper we focus on the micro-economic effects and refer readers to Figueiredo
and Francis (2018) where we address the macro-economic implications of FGTS policy.4
3.3 Empirical Considerations
This section discusses important features of Brazil’s labor market dynamics that will guide the
design of our theoretical model. We begin with the separation rates across different ages and tenure
lengths.
3Since 2017, employers and employees can negotiate wage reductions if certain requirements are met: the firm
must provide evidence that the current wage level threatens the financial viability of the business; the employer cannot
negotiate wage reductions on a one-by-one cases, i.e., wage reductions can only take place under collective bargaining;
the employee must accept the conditions, otherwise no wage reductions are allowed and the firm is forced to either fire
the worker and pay the severance package or keep the employee in the workforce at the current wage.
4Specifically, in that paper we examine aggregate labor movements during recent recessionary episodes in Brazil
and how labor dynamics differs under FGTS policy from those under the frictionless environment and situations with
other forms of labor adjustment policies.
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To compute the separation rates we combine worker flow data from CAGED5 and employed-
worker stock from RAIS6 for the 2002-2018 period. We obtained the number of workers that were
terminated without cause - and are therefore entitled to termination penalty compensation - from
CAGED and divided by the number of workers employed at the beginning of the year. Both data
sources report labor statistics categorized in groups according to age and tenure length.
Worker flow data are available on a monthly frequency whereas stock data are measured annu-
ally. This discrepancy affects our separation rate results for workers with up to one year of tenure
because workers with less than one year on the job may have found the current position during the
reference year and, thus, would not be accounted for in the stock of employed workers at the be-
ginning of the year. Nevertheless, our decision to average separation rates across periods is based
on the stability of group (age, tenure) sizes relative to the entire population of workers over time.
Figure A.29 displays separation rates as tenure length increases within each of the following
age groups: 25-29, 30-39, 40-49, and 50-64. Two features are particularly noteworthy: the high
separation rates for workers aged 50 and above and the downward sloping separation rate along
tenure length within all age groups.
First, separation rates in the 50-64 age group are significantly higher than those of other groups.
In the most extreme case, separation rate for workers with time on the job between two and three
years in the 50-64 group is roughly twenty times as large as that of workers in the 30-39 age group
with similar tenure.
The high separation rate for individuals aged 50 and above is not exclusive to Brazil. Cheron
et al. (2013) document that separation rates are U-shaped over the life cycle in the U.S. and France.
In this sense, the relatively high separation rates in the 25-29 age group, to the reference 30-39
group, in Brazil are in line with the observed pattern for the above-mentioned countries.
Figure A.29 also shows that separation rates vary considerably across tenure lengths within age
groups. In particular, separation rates decline unambiguously for all age groups as tenure increases.
5General Register of Employed and Unemployed Persons.
6Annual Social Information Report.
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For workers with tenure greater than twenty years separation rates are virtually zero. This feature
of the data is central to our argument that tenure-dependent severance penalty induces inertia in
labor flows.
In addition to the separation patterns across the age and tenure dimensions, the dynamics of
labor productivity are essential to characterize the underlying forces driving labor flows. Since
productivity is not observable, we turn our attention to the wage distribution along age and tenure.
Note that our universe of workers is restricted to the formal sector and labor relations are thus
regulated by the Consolidated Labor Laws.7 Brazil’s labor legislation severely limits employer
and employees’ ability to negotiate working hours. Hence labor fluctuations are essentially on the
extensive margin and wage expenditures are due to hourly wages rather than an increase in the
number of hours worked.
With these peculiar features of Brazil’s labor market in mind, we estimate a wage regression
with worker-level data observed annually. Our panel spans the 2002-2017 period for a cross section
of ten million workers that appear at least twice in the period. Our benchmark specification follows
wit = αi + αt + β1 ageit + β2 age
2
it + β3 tenureit + β4 tenure
2
it (3.1)
+ β5 ageit · tenureit + εit,
where wit is agent’s i log-wage at time t.
Equation 3.1 is estimated via OLS and parameter estimates and t-statistics with clustered stan-
dard errors are displayed on Table A.6. Both age and tenure have positive marginal effects on wage
throughout most of the life cycle though the magnitude of the effects decline as age and tenure in-
crease. In fact, the marginal effect of age becomes negative after 61 years for a newly employed
worker (having zero tenure). Turning points for age under five and ten years of tenure are 62 and
63.5 years, respectively.
These results are hardly surprising. Brazil’s pension system is divided in two regimes, urban
7Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho
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and rural, and each regime has specific rules for retirement eligibility. Under the urban regime,
workers are must meet one of two criteria: “contribution time” or minimum age, whichever hap-
pens first. Males are eligible to collect pension if they make payments to social security for at least
thirty-five years or turn sixty-five. Females may retire after thirty years of contribution or if they
turn sixty years old. Workers under the rural regime are not required to meet a contribution time
cutoff and are eligible to retire at sixty and fifty-five for males and females respectively.
Formal-sector jobs disproportionately target skilled professionals and high-earning workers
typically retire under the contribution time criterion. On average, men retire at 55 under contri-
bution time and 62 under minimum age criteria. The pattern is similar for women, who retire
on average at 52 under the contribution time and 58 under minimum age respectively. Pensions
granted8 to new retirees under contribution time amounted to R$2, 498.23 and R$2, 132.33 for
males and females. Under the minimum-age criterion, the respective figures are R$1, 205.51 and
R$1, 089.47. Since pensions are proportional to lifetime earnings, individuals who are eligible to
retire under contribution time regime earned significantly higher wages during their careers relative
to those who retire under the minimum-age requirement.
Therefore, the negative marginal effect of age on wages for ages over 60 reflects the fact that
individuals who remain in the workforce after 60 typically earn lower wages. Nevertheless, for the
purpose of our analysis the positive marginal effect of age on wages during most of the individuals’
careers provides valuable insight on the productivity allocation along the age dimension.
According to Table A.6, the marginal effect of tenure on wages is also positive and decreasing
in magnitude. Even though the presence of the interaction term implies that the marginal effect of
tenure depends on the age level, the turning points9 120 and 153 years under ages 20 and 60 fall
outside the range of feasible tenure. Hence, we can think of tenure as having a positive marginal
effect on wages throughout the workers’ entire career.
While the terminology “marginal effects” is used when referring to combinations of parameter
8Data available on Brazil’s social security office website.
9Tenure level after which the marginal effect of tenure becomes negative.
77
estimates that yield ∂ E(w|x)
∂ x
in Eq. 3.1, one must bear in mind that a causal interpretation would be
misguided at this stage. Estimates of Eq. 3.1 are the outcome of a reduced-form model estimated
on data generated by an unknown data generating process. Instead, we use the reduced-form results
to discipline our theoretical model; essentially our conjecture about the data generating process.
3.4 The Model
We consider a model economy in which agents with varying ages are matched to firms in the
spirit of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Job search is random and workers of different ages
compete for the same vacancies, in line with Cheron et al. (2013). Job destruction is endogenous
but firms face a severance penalty whose magnitude is determined by the history of wages paid to
the worker.
The severance penalty is a de facto layoff tax, whose effects on labor dynamics have been
documented in Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Saint-Paul (1995) and Mortensen and Pissarides
(1999), to name a few. Their approach, however, assumed an exogenously determined lump-sum
tax whereas in our framework the tax rate is determined outside the model.
3.4.1 Model Framework
Time is discrete. In each period, a new generation of workers is born and lives on for T + 1
periods. Agents are born unemployed and retire after T periods. All cohorts have the same size
and are normalized to unit measure. We denote the measure of employed workers of age i and









In a given period, firms post vacancies of measure v and employers and unemployed work-
ers meet10 according to homogeneous function M(u, v) = Auα v1−α. To make the notation less
cumbersome, we denote job market tightness by θ = v
u
and the probability that a firm finds a can-






. Conversely, unemployed workers meet potential
employers with probability θ q(θ) = M (1, θ). We assume firms enter the market freely.
10We take care to say meet to highlight fact that in our setting there will be another hurdle before production takes
place.
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After firm and worker meet, a productivity level ε is drawn for the worker from (cumulative)
distribution G (ε) with support on the interval [0, 1]. Upon observing productivity ε, the firm
decides whether to operate the job. Specifically, if the observed productivity is greater than the
reservation productivity for a worker aged i then the firm operates the job.
The job destruction mechanism has similar structure. Specifically, a productive relationship
between a firm and a worker aged i with FGTS holdings τ is broken if the worker’s productivity
level is lower than reservation productivity Ri(τ), conditional on a new productivity being drawn.
The following sections discuss the inter-temporal choice of firms and workers. We then study the
effect of FGTS-based severance penalty on wages and labor flows.
3.4.2 Firms
Value from a worker aged i with tenure h with accumulated savings τ at productivity level ε is
given by
Ji (ε, τ) = max
{
ε− wi(ε) + β
[
λ Ji+1(ε, τ








s.t. τ ′ = τ + δ0wi(ε). (3.2)
where V is the value from a vacancy and δ1 τ is the severance penalty for a worker with age-FGTS
profile (i, τ). The worker’s FGTS balance evolves according to τ ′ = τ + δ0wi(ε). Under current
legislation, δ0 = 0.08 and δ1 = 0.5.
The term right of the comma in the max operator denotes the value from terminating the
worker - or not operating the job, which entails the benefit from a potential match in the future and
the costs of posting a vacancy and compensating the worker for the termination. The cumulative
nature of the severance penalty implies that long-tenured workers are more costly to fire than their
short-tenured counterparts.
The term on the left-hand side in the max operator is the value from keeping the job operating.
We assume workers carry the current productivity level over to the next period with probability λ.
With probability 1−λ a new productivity level is drawn fromG(·). Having on-the-job productivity
draws admits endogenous break-ups into the model. It also allows heterogeneity in wages and
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tenure within and across age groups.
The firm’s period surplus is simply the labor productivity net of wages. The underlying as-
sumption being that production displays constant returns to scale.
The value from a vacancy is given by









+ β [1− q(θ)]V (3.3)




′) dG(ε′) denotes the expected value of
operating a job with an i-aged worker given that her productivity draw is higher than the reservation
productivity for her age Ri(0). If the productivity drawn is lower than Ri(0), which occurs with









′, 0) dG(ε′)+G [Ri(0)]V denotes the expected value from
meeting, given that the potential worker is aged i.
Since search is random, workers aged 1, ..., T − 1 are potential matches. The probability of an
unemployed worker being aged i is ui
u








′, 0) dG(ε′) +G [Ri(0)]V
)
expresses the unconditional expected value from a new meeting. With probability 1−q(θ) a meting
does not occur and the firm enjoys value V .
3.4.3 Workers
Workers derive utility from wages when employed and leisure when unemployed. The value
from being employed at age i with accumulated savings τ is
Ei (ε, τ) =

wi(ε) + β λEi+1 (ε, τ




′, τ ′) dG(ε′) if ε ≥ Ri (τ)
Ui + δ1 τ if ε < Ri(τ).
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+ β [1− θq(θ)]Ui+1.
If the drawn productivity level is higher than reservation productivity Ri(τ), then the firm
operates the job and the worker gets the continuation value above. Otherwise, the match breaks
and the worker gets value from unemployment Ui plus severance compensation δ1 τ .
Value from unemployment comes from leisure z and the possibility of finding a match





+ β [1− θq(θ)]Ui+1.
A solution to the functional equations Eq. 3.2 is a set of reservation productivities {Ri(τ)} that
make the firm indifferent between keeping or breaking the match and obey the terminal conditions
UT+1 = z̃, leisure from retirement
ET (ε, τ) = wT (ε) + β UT+1, value from working in the last productive period
JT (ε, τ) = max {ε− wT (ε) + β V, V − δ1 τ} ,
which denotes the firm’s value from having a worker in her last period before retirement. If the
firm chooses to operate the job, it enjoys value V with certainty in the next period.
3.4.4 Wage Determination
The equilibrium wage is determined in the Nash bargaining between the firm and workers. We
denote the share of the surplus captured by the workers and firms by φ and 1 − φ respectively.
The surplus from a job operated by a worker aged i under productivity ε and FGTS holdings τ is
denoted by Si(ε, τ) = Ji (ε, τ) + Ei (ε, τ)− Ui.
If drawn productivity is lower than threshold Ri(τ), then surplus is zero. On the other hand, if
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ε ≥ Ri(τ) then
Si(ε, τ) = ε+ β λ [Si+1(ε, τ




′, τ ′)dG(ε′) + β(1− λ)Ui+1 − Ui
= ε+ β λSi+1(ε, τ




′, τ ′)dG(ε′)− (Ui − βUi+1) .
From the Nash bargaining, Ei(ε, τ)−Ui = φSi(ε, τ) and Ji(ε, τ) = (1−φ)Si(ε, τ). From the
expression for Si(ε, τ) we can derive the equilibrium wage wi(ε) as follows:
Ei(ε, τ)− Ui = φSi(ε, τ)
Ei(ε, τ)− Ui = φ [Ei(ε, τ) + Ji(ε, τ)− Ui]⇒ (1− φ)Ui = Ei(ε, τ)− φ [Ei(ε, τ) + Ui]




′, τ ′) + Ui+1] dG(ε
′)
− φ








= wi(ε)− φ ε+ β λ (1− φ)Ui+1 + β λφUi+1 = wi(ε)− φ ε+ β (1− φ)Ui+1
⇒ wi(ε) = φ ε+ (1− φ) (Ui − β Ui+1) .
Therefore, equilibrium wage is determined by the workers’ share of surplus plus a compensa-
tion to the worker for leaving the job search. Because the value from unemployment consists of
leisure plus the value from a potential match, leaving unemployment in the current period entails
forgoing a new job search in the next period.
3.4.5 Worker Flows
To close the model we need to specify worker flows across employment and unemployment. To
characterize the flows of workers in and out of unemployment, recall that we denote the measure of
unemployed workers aged i by ui and the measure of employed workers aged iwith FGTS holdings
τ by ρi(τ). Naturally,
∫ τ̄
o
ρi(τ)dτ = 1−ui, where τ̄ is the upper bound for FGTS holdings - which
is age-specific though we abstract from this feature to keep the notation manageable.
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The law of motion for {ui}Ti=1 is given by













where the measure of unemployed aged-i workers equals the measure of unemployed workers at
age i − 1 that either did not meet an employer or did meet but whose productivity draw was not
high enough to clear the reservation productivity at Ri(τ = 0) plus the measure of workers aged
i− 1 that lost their jobs.
In equilibrium, the flow of workers aged i−1 that lose their jobs must equal the flow of workers








dτ = ui−2 θ q(θ) [1−G (Ri−1(0))] .
Combining the law of motion and labor flow equations yields




+ ui−2 θ q(θ) [1−G (Ri−1(0))] , (3.4)
which allows us to characterize age-specific unemployment rates recursively.
We solve the model numerically. Details about the computational methods are discussed in
Appendix A.2.
3.5 Results
We follow Pissarides (2009) and set the tightness parameter to θ = 0.72. In practice, θ is
determined endogenously in Eq. 3.3, hence calibrating the value of θ is equivalent to setting the
cost of posting a vacancy. Figure A.30 depicts the firm’s value from an experienced worker who
had enough time to accrue sizable FGTS holdings. We consider two scenarios. In the first, the
worker’s FGTS holdings are zero - which is only possible if worker and firm have just met. The
second scenario reflects the firm’s value from an employee with FGTS holdings τ = 0.45.
If the firm decides to terminate the worker with τ = 0.45 then it attains the value of a vacancy
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plus the negative cash flow that severance compensation entails: V − δ1 τ = −0.225, as the value
from a vacancy is zero in equilibrium. Naturally, if firm and worker have just met, then the firm
faces no severance cost if it chooses to not operate the job.
The productivity levels that make the firm indifferent between terminating the worker and keep-
ing the match - or, in the case of τ = 0, indifferent between operating the job and resuming the
search - are depicted in Figure A.30 as the points at which the value curves kink. At these produc-
tivity levels, referred to as reservation productivity throughout the text, the value from operating
the job, upward sloping portion of the firm’s value curves, equals the value from terminating the
worker, flat range of value curves.
Note that if drawn productivity is greater than reservation productivity for the potential new
hire, i.e., ε > Ri(0), then the value attained from a worker with FGTS holdings τ = 0 is identical
to that of a worker with τ > 0 even if the firm’s value is, in a general sense, decreasing in τ . To
understand why that is the case, first note that given the worker’s age, potential new hires face the
highest productivity threshold because reservation productivity is decreasing in FGTS holdings.
Moreover, productivity-wage rates are age-specific only, so similarly aged workers with different
FGTS holdings earn the same wage in our model. Since the firm chooses to operate the job if
productivity is high enough given FGTS holdings, if the productivity draw clears the bar today
then it is certainly high enough to clear reservation productivity in the next period because FGTS
holdings will be higher and reservation productivity decreases with τ . Hence, ε > Ri(0) ensures
identical value from workers with heterogeneous FGTS holdings.
Figure A.30 shows the firm’s highest attainable value given FGTS holdings and productivity
levels. In other words, the firm’s optimal choice can be elicited from the value curve in the said
figure. From this perspective, the mechanism through which the FGTS severance policy distorts
the firm’s decision becomes evident: if productivity lies in the range Ri(τ) ≤ ε ≤ Ri(0) then it is
beneficial for the firm to operate the job even if doing so yields negative value. That is, the firm
takes a loss because terminating the worker would ensue an even greater loss.
Figure A.31 depicts reservation productivities across age profiles and FGTS levels. For poten-
tial new hires, τ = 0, reservation productivity increases with age, which is not surprising when
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we consider the higher continuation value obtained from younger workers relative to those closer
to retirement age. Since the search process is costly to employers, we can think of the higher
reservation productivity of older workers as compensation to the firm for their short careers. In
the extreme case of workers with only one period left before retirement, reservation productivity is
extremely high because the firm knows it will face a costly search with certainty in the next period.
This feature sheds light in the difficulty that older workers face when unemployed: even if they
meet potential employers with the same probability as younger workers, θ q(θ), the probability
that firm will choose to operate the job is significantly lower vis-à-vis meeting younger workers of
similar productivity.
On the other hand, employed workers that reach pre-retirement age with even relatively low
FGTS holdings enjoy significant job security as they face reservation productivity zero for τ as low
as 0.22. The fact that the worker will leave the workforce in the next period with certainty makes
the wait for the worker’s retirement more advantageous than terminating the worker in the current
period.
While the reservation productivity for a worker aged T declines quickly to zero, workers who
are only a few periods short of retirement face high reservation productivity along all FGTS levels.
That is the case because when the firm chooses to operate a job with a worker only a few periods
short of retirement, it delays the search for a new worker that could potentially be in the beginning
of her career and would yield considerably high value - in a present value sense. By the same
token, the firm is willing to operate the job at low productivity levels with young workers because
even though their productivity is low in the current period, they will likely stay with the firm for a
long time.
Although the probability of meeting an employer is the same across ages, the probability that
the firm will operate the job is not. In particular, the probability that the firm operates the job,
1 − G [Ri+1(τ)], declines with age - as seen in Figure A.31. The decline in the probability of
matching successfully with an employer is key to the decreasing value from unemployment along
the life cycle.
The dynamics of reservation productivity across FGTS levels are determinant for flows and
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age-specific unemployment rates. Specifically, an employed worker aged i with FGTS holdings τ
loses her job with probability G [Ri+1(τ)], conditional on a new productivity level being drawn.
Hence, the unconditional separation rate is (1−λ) ρi(τ)G [Ri+1(τ)] since measure ρi(τ) of workers
aged i with FGTS level τ get a new draw with probability 1− λ that does not clear the reservation
productivity with probability G [Ri+1(τ)]. To understand worker flows to unemployment given
that the worker draws a new productivity level, we display G [Ri(τ)] across ages i in Figure A.31.
Reservation productivity provide valuable insight on the age-specific stock of unemployed
workers as pointed out in Eq. 3.4. In Figure A.32 we plot the age-specific separation rates for
given levels of FGTS balances. Overall, we observe that separation rates decline in the level of
FGTS balances as firms are reluctant to break relationships the more expensive the separation. For
each age group there is a value beyond which firms will choose to hoard workers. For workers near
retirement we see that this a cutoff FGTS balance is 0.24, about half the critical value of the next
oldest group. These cutoff values indicate where firms find it cost-effective to wait until workers
retire. Another feature of the model is that firms will quickly separate from older workers with
very low FGTS - for the same accumulated FGTS younger workers have greater job security.
Figure A.33 shows unemployment rates across ages. Since agents start out unemployed, un-
employment rate is 1 for agents aged 1. Non-directed search implies that given that a firm and an
unemployed worker met, the worker is more likely to come from a high-unemployment age group.
In this sense, the low unemployment of workers aged 2 is driven by the number of new-born work-
ers that entered the labor market in the previous period.
For ages greater than three, unemployment rates are increasing as result of age-increasing reser-
vation productivities. The bottom panel of Figure A.33 displays unemployment rates for this par-
ticular group - age greater than three - to highlight the upward sloping pattern of unemployment
rates across age groups without the influence of early-age unemployment particularities.
Leisure from unemployment is constant across ages, so the curvature in the value from unem-
ployment, Figure A.34, must come from the age-specific probability of successfully matching with
an employer and from the number of periods remaining in the workforce. To be clear, even if the
probability of matching - i.e., meeting and operating the job - were constant across ages, value
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from unemployment would still be higher for younger workers as they have the potential to collect
wages for a longer period. This feature of finite-horizon models has been discussed in the literature
by Cheron et al. (2013), among others.
In addition to this finite-horizon effect, the age-increasing reservation productivity reinforces
the declining value from unemployment across ages, a feature that Figure A.34 makes evident.
Note that value from unemployment declines at a decreasing rate, which makes the benefit from
not spending another period in unemployment, Ui − β Ui+1, increasing with age. In other words,
the curvature in the value from unemployment implies that the benefit from taking a job instead of
waiting another period increases with age.
The curvature in the value from unemployment enables our model to deliver equilibrium wages
that increase with age even under our assumption that the unconditional distribution of labor
productivity is the same across ages. From wi(ε) = φ ε + (1 − φ) (Ui − β Ui+1), the term
(1 − φ) (Ui − β Ui+1) increases with age for reasons previously established. However, because
reservation productivity rises with age, the term φ ε also increases with age because the range of
productivity levels that do not break the match shrinks as age increases.
Note, however, that wage is age and productivity specific but not FGTS-level specific. In
this sense, our model does not imply that agents with large FGTS holdings earn more than their
relative low-FGTS counterparts in a general sense, but that they may earn more relative to their
productivity. To be specific, note that given the FGTS level and productivity draw, the firm faces
a binary choice: either operate the job or terminate the worker. If the firm chooses to operate the
job, then it must pay the equilibrium wage given the worker’s age-productivity profile regardless of
her FGTS holdings. The benefit from large FGTS holdings comes from the range of productivity
levels11 that would lead to a termination in the absence of the FGTS severance penalty but that the
firm chooses to keep the match because the magnitude of the severance compensation is too large.
From such perspective, given a set of workers with FGTS holdings τ , the agents that extract
an “FGTS-penalty” rent are those whose productivity levels would not be high enough to establish
11Shaded area in Figure A.30.
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a match if they were unemployed. Thus the FGTS-based severance is detrimental to the firms’
economic performance because it leads to labor hoarding of low-productivity workers since value
from workers with productivity above the zero-FGTS cutoff does not depend on FGTS holdings.
At the aggregate level, the FGTS policy may compromise economic performance to an even
greater extent. If labor productivity is partially driven by macroeconomic factors then individual
productivity outcomes are correlated and the share of low-productivity workers can be higher in
recessions. Our model suggests that the FGTS level does not play a major role in labor deci-
sions regarding high-productivity workers. Instead, labor hoarding occurs in the low end of the
productivity spectrum, reinforcing the depressing effect of recessions on firms’ performance.
3.6 Conclusion
We propose a model in which firms face a layoff penalty that is proportional to the worker’s
history of earned wages. Specifically, the severance penalty amounts to four percent of all wages
collected during the current employment, in line with the FGTS policy in Brazil.
Our main finding is that workers who are able to extract a severance penalty rent have low
productivity and would not be hired by the firm if they were unemployed. In particular, we find
a negative relation between FGTS holdings and the minimum productivity required to remain
employed. Incentives to keep high-productivity workers are the same under the FGTS policy and
a flexible labor environment.
Our model also rationalizes important features of the data such as wages that increase with
age and low job-finding rate among older unemployed workers. The effects of the FGTS policy
in an environment with search frictions and aggregate uncertainty is a potential avenue for future
research. While Figueiredo and Francis (2018) discuss the role of an FGTS-based labor adjustment
cost in a two-sector economy with aggregate and sector-specific productivity fluctuations, their
framework assumed a representative agent that supplies labor in the absence of search frictions.
In this sense, the impact of Brazil’s severance penalty regulation in terms of efficiency loss due to




A.1 Chapter 1: Model
A.1.1 Preference for robustness
Hansen and Sargent (2008) put forth the idea of an agent that has a benchmark model of how the
economy works but is concerned that her model may be misspecified. In this sense, her decision
must be optimal under the benchmark model but also under the set of alternative “reasonable”
models.
We denote the agent’s benchmark model by the probability measure p0(st+1|st) that governs
state transitions, conditional on history st. Choosing the optimal consumption path under fear of
model misspecification boils down to maximizing lifetime utility under the worst-case scenario:


















denotes the state-space, u(·) is period utility and δ is the time discount factor.
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[∫


















′|s) + λ p0(s′|s) = 0
⇒ log (m(s′|s)) = −θ U(s′)− 1− λ θ




m(s′|s) p0(s′|s)ds′ = 1⇒
∫
exp {−θU(s′)− 1− λθ} p(s′|s)ds′ = 1
⇒
∫
exp {−θU(s′)} p(s′|s)ds′ = exp {1 + λθ}





Back to first-order condition:
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is known as of t, conditional expectation Et(·) on both sides of the
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A.1.2 Solution to the planner’s problem
The planner’s problem is
Max
{xht, xft, yht, yft}∞
t=0
µUh0 + (1− µ)Uf0
subject to xht + xft = Xt






































pseudo-Pareto weights for the home and foreign agents respectively. Equilibrium allocations
















xht + xft = Xt
yht + yft = Yt.
Denote the ratio of pseudo-Pareto weights by ϕt(st) =
µh(st)
µf (st)
. Then the solution to the system





















α + (1− α)ϕt(st)
Yt(s
t).









. Note that the innovations to the pseudo-Pareto weights are identical to the Radon-
















































A.1.3 Exchange rate and stochastic discount factors
LetMXht andM
Y
ft denote the home and foreign agents’ stochastic discount factors in terms their























Let et be the exchange rate in units of home currency per one unit of foreign currency. If
markets are complete then contingent claims exist for all possible states. From Eq. 1.6, the
price in home currency of a contingent claim that pays one unit of “currency” X if state st+1 is
qXt (st+1|st) = p0(st+1|st)MXh,t+1(st+1|st). Notation p0(ss+t|st) denotes state transition probability
given history st.
From the foreign agent’s perpective, an asset that pays one unit of currency X contingent on
state st+1 commands price




as one unit of currency X in period t+ 1 is worth
1
et+1(st+1|st)
units of currency Y .
Since the law of one price holds, the contingent claim must command the same price in both
domestic and foreign markets. That is, qYt (st+1|st)et = qXt (st+1|st). Rearranging the expressions
























α + (1− α)ϕt





1− α + αϕt















A.2 Chapter 3: Model Solution
A solution to our model is a set of reservation productivities {Ri(τ)}Ti=2 that make the firm
indifferent between keeping or breaking the match and fulfill terminal conditions JT (ε, τ). Specif-
ically, {Ri(τ)}Ti=1 solves the system
Ji (ε, τ) = max
{
ε− wi(ε) + β
[
λ Ji+1(ε, τ




′, τ ′) dG(ε′)
]
, V − δ1τ
}
s.t. τ ′ = τ + δ0wi(ε). (A.2)
JT (ε, τ) = max
{
ε−WT (ε) + β V, V − δ1 τ
}
.
In order to solve for {Ri(τ)}, we need {wi(ε)}Ti=2, which, in turn, depends on value from
unemployment {Ui}Ti=2 that depends on value from employment {Ei(ε, 0)}
T
i=2.
Our solution strategy consists in approximating {Ji(ε, τ)}Ti=2 and {Ei(ε, τ)}
T
i=2 numerically via
Chebyshev polynomials. Chebyshev polynomials have been extensively used in Macroeconomics
because of their convenient properties, such as bounded domain and orthogonal basis. In partic-
ular, the orthogonality of the columns in the Chebyshev-generated basis matrix is critical for the
computational efficiency of our solution method. A more detailed treatment of Chebyshev polyno-
mials is available in Fornberg (1996) and Boyd (2001). Fernández-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramı́rez, and
Schorfheide (2016) compare the performance of Chebyshev polynomials to that of other solution
methods in a standard RBC model.
To make our exposition clear, let Φk(x) denote the k-th order Chebyshev polynomial in x, wich
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can be computed recursively according to
Φ1(x) = 1
Φ2(x) = x
Φk(x) = 2xΦk−1(x)− Φk−2(x), k ≥ 2,
for x ∈ [−1, 1]. An equivalent approach is Φk(x) = cos [(k − 1) cos−1(x)].
Labor productivity is uniformly distributed in [0, 1]. We discretize the [0, 1] interval inm points
that are assigned probability 1
m
each. The grid for state variable τ is generated by the roots of the
Chebyshev interpolating polynomial. The roots Φn(x) = 0 are called Chebyshev interpolation
nodes and, unlike a grid with uniformly spaced nodes, Chebyshev interpolation nodes tend to
populate the extremes of the [−1, 1] domain (see Figure A.36).
Let xk denote the k-th Chebyshev node of a polynomial of order n. That is, Φ(xk) = 0 for





xk maps Chebyshev node xk into the set of feasible FGTS holdings [0, τ̄ ]. The polynomial
interpolation consists of linear systems
Ji (εj, τk) = a
ij
1 Φ1(xk) + a
ij
2 Φ2(xk) + ...+ a
ij
n Φn(xk) (A.3)
Ei (εj, τk) = b
ij
1 Φ1(xk) + b
ij
2 Φ2(xk) + ...+ b
ij
n Φn(xk)
for each age i = 1, ..., T − 1 and productivity level j = 1, ...,m. In practice, fitting n-order
Chebyshev polynomials implies solving an n-by-n linear system m × T − 1 × 2 times in every
step of the following iterative process:
Step 1: Given starting values for polynomial coefficients a and b, compute Ji and Ei as in Eq.
A.3.
Step 2: Use {Ei} from previous step and compute value from unemployment Ui for i =
1, ..., T − 1.
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Step 3: Use Ui from previous step and compute equilibrium wages wi(ε).
Step 4: Use Ji and Ei from Step 1, Ui and wi(ε) from Steps 2 and 3 and compute J̃i(εj, τk) and
Ẽi(εj, τk) as follows:
J̃i(εj, τk) = max
{




















, and τ ′k,ij = τk + δ0wi(εj)



















, Ui + δ1τk
}
Step 5: Coefficient updating. Stack
J̃ij =
[




Ẽi(εj, τ1), ... , Ẽi(εj, τn)
]′
and update coefficients aijnew = Ψ
−1 J̃ij and bijnew = Ψ








Step 6: Compute updated Ĵij = Ψ aijnew and Êij = Ψ b
ij
new and distances dJ = max
i,j,k
|Ji(εj, τk)−
Ĵi(εj, τk)| and dE = max
i,j,k
|Ei(εj, τk)− Êi(εj, τk)|, which measure the improvement in polynomial
fit in current iteration.
Step 7: Given tolerance error ∆, if either dj > ∆ or dE > ∆, then set a = anew and b = bnew
and return to Step 1.
Finding good starting values for coefficients a and b is not trivial. Instead, we take advantage of
the terminal conditions JT (ε, τ) and ET (ε, τ) which are know given wT (ε). Since wT (ε) depends
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only on ε, Ut and UT+1, which are all known, we set a0 = Ψ−1 JT and b0 = Ψ−1 ET as initial
values for a and b.
The results shown in Section 3.5 were obtained with Chebyshev polynomials of order n = 23.
We avoid error propagation from starting values we start with n = 3, iterate until convergence,
and then use the results as starting values for a polynomial of order 5 approximation - coefficients
of terms of order greater than three are set to zero. We proceed with n = 5, 7, 11, 17 and 23. At
n = 23, coefficients of high-order terms are virtually zero for all ages and productivity levels.
Tolerance error is set to 10−5.
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A.3 Figures
Figure A.1: Filtered values for the global factor of output growth. Percentiles 0.05, 0.5 and 0.95 of
posterior distributions shown. Annualized volatility in the right panel.
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Figure A.2: Filtered values for the BRICS factor of output growth. Percentiles 0.05, 0.5 and 0.95
of posterior distributions shown. Annualized volatility in the right panel. BRICS countries: Brazil,
Russia, India, China and South Africa.
Figure A.3: Empirical autocorrelation functions of the global and BRICS factors.
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Figure A.4: Precision of exposure to global factor. Prior distribution (dotted) and posteriors for
emerging (solid) and developed (dashed) countries.
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Figure A.7: Responses to a 1-s.d. shock to the volatility of the global factor. Structural shocks
identified via Cholesky decomposition of residuals’ covariance matrix. Bayesian VAR(1) esti-
mated with flat-Normal prior for autoregressive coefficients and inverse-Whishart for residuals’
covariance matrix. Vector ordering: exchange rate growth, consumption-output ratio, trade bal-
ance growth, global factor level (posterior mean), global factor volatility (posterior mean).
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Figure A.8: Responses to a 1-s.d. shock to the volatility of the global factor. Structural shocks
identified via Cholesky decomposition of residuals’ covariance matrix. Bayesian VAR(1) esti-
mated with flat-Normal prior for autoregressive coefficients and inverse-Whishart for residuals’
covariance matrix. Vector ordering: global factor volatility (posterior mean), global factor level
(posterior mean), exchange rate growth, consumption-output ratio, trade balance growth.
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Figure A.9: Impulse-responses implied by model economy. Responses to a 1-s.d. shock to the
volatility of global factor. ’Measure distortion’ denotes the additional probability weight assigned





erence for robustness parameter set at θ = 15. Low home bias in consumption: α = 0.8. Hetero-
geneous exposure to global factor: βh = 1.2 and βf = 0.
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Figure A.10: Impulse-responses implied by model economy. Responses to a 1-s.d. shock to the
volatility of global factor. ’Measure distortion’ denotes the additional probability weight assigned





erence for robustness parameter set at θ = 15. Moderate home bias in consumption: α = 0.95.
Heterogeneous exposure to global factor: βh = 1.2 and βf = 0.
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Figure A.11: Impulse-responses implied by model economy. Responses to a 1-s.d. shock to the
volatility of global factor. ’Measure distortion’ denotes the additional probability weight assigned





erence for robustness parameter set at θ = 15. Strong home bias in consumption: α = 0.98.
Heterogeneous exposure to global factor: βh = 1.2 and βf = 0.
107
Figure A.12: Impulse-responses implied by model economy. Responses to a 1-s.d. shock to the
volatility of global factor. ’Measure distortion’ denotes the additional probability weight assigned





erence for robustness parameter set at θ = 15. Moderate home bias in consumption: α = 0.95.
Homogeneous exposure to global factor: βh = 1.2 and βf = 1.2.
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Figure A.13: Impulse-responses implied by model economy. Responses to a 1-s.d. shock to
the volatility of global factor. ’Measure distortion’ denotes the additional probability weight as-





Preference for robustness parameter set at θ = 15. No home bias in consumption: α = 0.5.
Heterogeneous exposure to global factor: βh = 1.2 and βf = 0.
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Figure A.14: Response of interest rates to a 1-s.d. shock to the volatility of the global factor.
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Figure A.15: Quarterly GDP growth and formal-sector labor index. Formal-sector index is work-
force employed in production of manufactured goods in the São Paulo state. Source: FIESP -
Federation of Industries of the State of São Paulo.
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Figure A.16: Labor level and real wage in the formal and informal sectors. Deviations from steady
state. Shaded areas indicate economic recessions.
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Figure A.17: Output, consumption, and investment. Deviations from steady state. All variables
are measured in real terms. Shaded areas indicate economic recessions.
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Figure A.18: Unfiltered data measured in Brazilian Reais (R$) of 12/2017 (log scale). Top panel:
aggregate FGTS deposits. Bottom panels: average wage in formal and informal sectors.
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Figure A.19: Left panel: aggregate FGTS holdings as share of GDP. Right panel: quarterly FGTS
deposits as share of private savings.
Figure A.20: Empirical density plots of prior and posterior distributions of adjustment cost param-
eters.
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Figure A.21: Empirical density plots of prior and posterior distributions of preference and produc-
tivity processes parameters.
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Figure A.22: Model-implied impulse responses. System is at steady state at t = 0 and a 1 s.d.
shock to long-memory TFP εmt arrives at t = 1. Aggregate investment in physical capital and
savings rate are lower under the labor adjustment cost implied by the FGTS policy relative to a
standard frictionless economy. Capital allocation shifts towards the informal sector.
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Figure A.23: Model-implied impulse responses. System is at steady state at t = 0 and a 1 s.d.
shock to long-memory TFP εmt arrives at t = 1. Employment and wage growth in the formal sector
is partially hampered by the adjustment cost. While lower wages incentivizes higher employment,
wage is only the direct price of labor in the model. The indirect price of labor, denoted by λH , rises
as as the labor increases and the result of these opposing forces generate the dynamics of formal-
sector labor. The wage wedge, which is defined as the difference between wage and marginal
product of labor, declines sharply as the economy improves, indicating that the productivity gains
are not promptly transferred to workers.
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Figure A.24: Recovery from the 2002 recession. Low employment in the period leading up to the
2002 recession entailed low aggregate FGTS holdings when the economy recovered. The small
termination penalty under the FGTS specification allowed enough flexibility in formal-sector labor
to account for the strong recovery. Both FGTS and qudratic adjustment models predict a capital
flow from formal to informal sector when the recovery starts.
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Figure A.25: Post-2008 Financial crisis. Impact of a negative short-memory productivity shock
during the decade-long expansion of Brazil’s economy. Both FGTS and quadratic adjustment
model adequately account for the mild labor decline during the 2009 recession. Both FGTS and
qudratic adjustment models predict a capital flow from formal to informal sector when the recovery
starts.
120
Figure A.26: Response to a negative productivity shock after expansions of varying lengths. Ex-
pansion length increases the cost of adjusting labor under the FGTS specification. FGTS holdings
decrease after a large initial decline in labor, reducing the adjusment cost further and prompting
another round of workforce decline.
Figure A.27: Response of share of informal labor LNt/ (LFt + LNt) to a negative productivity
shock after expansions of varying lengths. Deviations from steady state.
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Figure A.28: Response to a positive productivity shock after expansions of varying lengths. After
48 months of economic expansion, FGTS holdings’ large balance make the cost of adjusting formal
labor considerably higher compared to that of a shorter expansion (12 months). Expansion length
is innocuous under quadratic adjustment.
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Figure A.29: Separation rates per age group and tenure length.
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Figure A.30: Firm value from experienced worker.
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Figure A.31: Reservation productivity wages by age and FGTS holdings.
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Figure A.32: Model-implied Separation rates per age and FGTS holdings.
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Figure A.33: Unemployment rate by age.
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Figure A.34: Age-specific value from unemployment.
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Figure A.35: Productivity wages by age.
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Figure A.36: Chebyshev polynomial of order 10.
130
A.4 List of Tables
Description Parameter Prior
Output growth trend (country-specific) µiy N (1, 1)
Unconditional log-variance (country-specific) µih N (−1, 16)







Volatility of log-variance (country-specific) σ2 Gamma (0.64, 4)
Volatility of log-variance (factor) σ2j Gamma (0.64, 4)





Persistence of stochastic volatility (idiosyncratic) φh+1
2
Beta(1, 1)










Global Europe BRICS Idiosyncratic Factor
0.988 0.819 -0.449 0.991 0.886




[0.026, 0.13] [0.057, 0.25] [0.609, 1.841]
Leverage
Global Europe BRICS Idiosyncratic
-0.754 -0.62 -0.584 -0.071
[−0.99998, −0.349] [−0.99954, −0.206] [−0.999, −0.08389] [−0.17, 0.031]
Volatility of log-variance
Global Europe BRICS Idiosyncratic
0.77 0.619 0.281 0.307
[0.416, 1.163] [0.231, 1.066] [0.084, 0.488] [0.256, 0.373]
Table A.2: Estimates for the Factor-Stochastic Volatility model described in Eq. 1.1. Posterior
means and 90% credible bounds shown.
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Factor Country 5% Median 95%
Europe
Germany 1 1 1
United Kingdom -0.255 0.902 2.137
Belgium 1.243 2.168 3.335
Denmark -1.074 0.439 1.874
France -0.582 0.308 1.275
Greece -4.628 -2.491 -1.259
Italy -0.845 0.195 1.253
Netherlands -0.158 1.124 2.478
Norway -0.882 -0.003 0.918
Spain -0.607 1.694 3.333
Sweden -0.908 0.589 2.069
Switzerland -0.634 0.641 1.945
Poland -1.799 0.984 3.649
BRICS
China 1 1 1
Russia -1.716 -0.675 0.235
Brazil 0.022 0.668 1.404
India -0.033 1.218 2.691
South Africa 2.379 4.146 6.329
Table A.3: Credibility intervals for exposure to Europe and BRICS factors.
Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Description Value
α Capital share in production 0.36
δ Capital depreciation 1− 0.901/12 = 0.008742
β Subjective discount factor 0.96(1/12) = 0.9966
1/φ Elasticity of labor supply 0.5
ηF Labor disutility (formal sector) 1
ηN Labor disutility (informal sector) 1
σF Volatility of formal-sector 0.02√12 = 0.005773
labor productivity
σN Volatility of informal-sector 0.02√12 = 0.005773
labor productivity
Table A.4: Calibrated parameters.
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Estimated Parameters
Parameter Description Prior Posterior
FGTS QAC
γ Risk aversion Gamma(4,3) 1.23 1.64
[1.224, 1.246] [1.632, 1.657]
ρ Persistence of TFP Beta(0.8,0.07) 0.97 0.975
[0.963, 0.977] [0.969, 0.981]
eµF Unconditional formal N(1.10,0.075) 1.14 1.041
sector labor productivity [1.138, 1.144] [1.039, 1.043]
σm Volatility of TFP shocks Gamma(0.02,0.015) 0.032 0.0172
(long memory) [0.027, 0.037] [0.014, 0.020]
σs Volatility of TFP shocks Inv. Gamma(0.04,∞) 0.0469 0.0382
(short memory) [0.039, 0.053] [0.032, 0.044]
θ FGTS adjustment cost Uniform[0,8] 1.381
[1.101, 1.660]
υ+ Quadratic adjustment cost N(0, 2.5) 3.98
[1.09, 7.15]
υ− Quadratic adjustment cost N(0, 2.5) 3.97
[0.96, 7]
Table A.5: Estimated structural parameters. Gamma priors: mean and standard deviation in paren-
thesis. Uniform priors: support lower and upper bounds in brackets. Posterior means and 90%
credible intervals displayed.
Benchmark model
Parameter Tenure Tenure2 Age Age2 Tenure · Age
Estimate 1.872 -0.009 4.223 -0.014 0.008





Table A.6: OLS estimates. Equation in top panel: wit = αi+αt+β1 ageit+β2 age2it+β3 tenureit+
β4 tenure
2
it + β5 ageit · tenureit + εit, where wit is log wage. Bottom panel imposes restrictions
β2 = 0, β4 = 0, and β5 = 0.
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Kastner, G., S. Frühwirth-Schnatter, and H. F. Lopes (2017). Efficient bayesian inference for
137
multivariate factor stochastic volatility models. Journal of Computational and Graphical Statis-
tics 26(4), 905–917.
Keane, M. and R. Rogerson (2012). Micro and macro labor supply elasticities: A reassessment of
conventional wisdom. Journal of Economic Literature 50(2), 464–476.
Kim, S., N. Shephard, and S. Chib (1998). Stochastic volatility: Likelihood inference and com-
parison with arch models. Review of Economic Studies 65(3), 361–393.
Knight, F. H. (1921). Risk, uncertainty and profit. New York: Hart, Schaffner and Marx.
Kose, M. A., C. Otrok, and C. H. Whiteman (2003). International business cycles: World, region,
and country-specific factors. american economic review 93(4), 1216–1239.
Kreps, D. M. and E. L. Porteus (1978). Temporal resolution of uncertainty and dynamic choice
theory. Econometrica: journal of the Econometric Society, 185–200.
Lopes, H. F. and C. M. Carvalho (2007). Factor stochastic volatility with time varying loadings and
markov switching regimes. Journal of Statistical Planning and Inference 137(10), 3082–3091.
Lopes, H. F. and M. West (2004). Bayesian model assessment in factor analysis. Statistica Sinica,
41–67.
Loureiro, P. R. A., R. A. Araujo, and N. A. de Souza (2013). An evaluation of the brazilian informal
labor market from 1995 to 2008. Journal of Economic Studies 40(1), 71–87.
Ludvigson, S. C., S. Ma, and S. Ng (2015, December). Uncertainty and business cycles: Exoge-
nous impulse or endogenous response? Working Paper 21803, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Lustig, H., N. Roussanov, and A. Verdelhan (2011). Common risk factors in currency markets.
The Review of Financial Studies 24(11), 3731–3777.
Mortensen, D. and C. A. Pissarides (1994). Job creation and job destruction in the theory of
unemployment. Review of Economic Studies 61(3), 397–415.
Mortensen, D. T. and C. A. Pissarides (1999). Unemployment responses to skill-biased technology
shocks: the role of labour market policy. The Economic Journal 109(455), 242–265.
Nakamura, E., D. Sergeyev, and J. Steinsson (2017). Growth-rate and uncertainty shocks in con-
sumption: Cross-country evidence. American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 9(1), 1–39.
Nelson, D. B. (1991). Conditional heteroskedasticity in asset returns: A new approach. Economet-
rica, 347–370.
Neumeyer, P. A. and F. Perri (2005). Business cycles in emerging economies: the role of interest
rates. Journal of monetary Economics 52(2), 345–380.
138
Omori, Y., S. Chib, N. Shephard, and J. Nakajima (2007). Stochastic volatility with leverage: Fast
and efficient likelihood inference. Journal of Econometrics 140(2), 425–449.
Pissarides, C. A. (2009). The unemployment volatility puzzle: Is wage stickiness the answer?
Econometrica 77(5), 1339–1369.
Pitt, M. and N. Shephard (1999). Time varying covariances: a factor stochastic volatility approach.
Bayesian statistics 6, 547–570.
Primiceri, G. E. (2005). Time varying structural vector autoregressions and monetary policy. The
Review of Economic Studies 72(3), 821–852.
Saint-Paul, G. (1995). The high unemployment trap. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110(2),
527–550.
Sargent, T. J. (1978). Estimation of dynamic labor demand schedules under rational expectations.
Journal of Political Economy 86(6), 1009–1044.
Savage, L. (1955). The foundations of statistics. New York: W iley.
Schorfheide, F., D. Song, and A. Yaron (2018). Identifying long run risks: A bayesian mixed
frequency approach. Econometrica 86(2), 617–654.
Shephard, N. (2005). Stochastic volatility: selected readings. Oxford University Press on Demand.
Sims, C. A. and T. Zha (2006, March). Were There Regime Switches in U.S. Monetary Policy?
American Economic Review 96(1), 54–81.
Smets, F. and R. Wouters (2007). Shocks and frictions in us business cycles: A bayesian dsge
approach. The American Economic Review 97(3), 586–606.
Stock, J. H. and M. W. Watson (2003, September). Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?
In NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2002, Volume 17, NBER Chapters, pp. 159–230. National
Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Weil, P. (1990). Nonexpected utility in macroeconomics. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 105(1), 29–42.
139
